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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
find a violation of Title VII relating to an improper classification of iden-
tical jobs with an illegal salary differential. 138
Such blatant sex discrimination as existed in the advertising depart-
ment of the Index-Journal will seldom occur as employers become more
subtle in the forms of discrimination inflicted on women and minorities.
The widespread practices that compensate women less for their work
than equally valuable men will continue until the courts take a stronger
stand against discriminatory pay scales that pay less for women's work
than men's. Judicial moderation and political conservatism no doubt
motivated the Fourth Circuit in shifting the analysis into the less com-
mon realm of discrimination by classification.139 The pernicious effects of
sex discrimination and the resulting economic injury suffered by women
in the work place, however, rebut moderation and demand that the
courts speak strongly against unfair employment practices which con-
tinue to prevent working women from attaining the salaries which they
deserve. The Fourth Circuit vindicated Martha Armstrong's rights and




A. District Court Discretion to Defer Arbitration
Proceedings Pending Resolution of Concurrent State Suits
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.1 Although federal
courts have plenary powers to decide controversies legitimately before
them,2 federal courts lack authority to define the extent of federal
jurisdiction.' In general, federal district courts exercise jurisdiction con-
"' See id.
' See Gitt & Gelb, supra note 2, at 729-30 (discrimination by classification seldom
litigated).
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981);
see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTs § 7 (2d ed. 1970) [heieinafter
cited as WRIGHT].
2 See Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (R Wheat.) 251, 255 (1824).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting forth jurisdiction of federal courts). Marbury v.
Madison established that Congress may not expand federal appellate jurisdiction beyond
the constitutionally mandated scope. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803). The
Constitution gives Congress the power to confer jurisdiction on lower federal courts. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1; see Cary v. Curtis, 15 U.S. (3 How.) 409, 416 (1844). The original jurisdic-
tion of federal district courts extends to cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or
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currently with state courts,4 although Congress may establish exclusive
federal jurisdiction over a particular type of controversy.' Concurrent
jurisdiction may encourage plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping6 or in-
vite plaintiffs and defendants to race to the court house.' The availability
of distinct, but theoretically equal, forums for litigation poses questions
that courts have had difficulty answering.8 Concurrent jurisdiction often
requires a determination of which court should decide the controversy
when cases involving similar parties and issues are before both state and
federal courts and each court has jurisdiction.9 Federal district courts
treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) [as amended, Pub. L. 96-486 § 2(a), 94
Stat. 2369 (1980)]. Original jurisdiction also extends to cases involving parties of diverse
citizenship if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
' See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (state courts competent to judge
federal constitutional claims); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (state and federal
courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under laws, treaties, or Constitu-
tion of United States unless Congress intended, expressly or by implication, to create ex-
clusive jurisdiction). See generally Fisher, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on
Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34
U. MIAMI L. REV. 175 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fisher].
I See, e.g., The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 411, 429-31 (1866) (statute vesting
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases is constitu-
tional exercise of congressional power); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) (federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases).
' See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (forum shopping may
preclude equal protection of law when plaintiff selects federal or state courts on basis of
more favorable law).
7 See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 865 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), affd 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979) (state court defendant seeks duplicative federal
forum thereby instituting "undignified" race to judgment between state and federal courts).
I Concurrent jurisdiction raises the issue of which court should decide the case. See
note 9 infra. A second issue is whether the law of the state forum or the federal forum
should apply. The supremacy clause of the Constitution requires a state court to apply
federal law when federal substantive law governs the controversy before the court. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). A federal court exercis-
ing diversity jurisdiction must apply the state law of the forum when the controversy
before the court does not arise under the Constitution or a federal statute. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Federal courts apply federal rules of procedure even in
diversity actions when state law governs the substantive issues in the case. See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). The dichotomy between application of substantive and pro-
cedural law produces the quandry of how to distinguish substantive from procedural law,
especially when the decision to apply federal or state law is outcome determinative. See id.
at 468-74. Furthermore, concurrent jurisdiction complicates the application of res judicata
and collateral estoppel principles as courts attempt to assess the binding effect of a final
judgment in one court on current or future proceedings in another. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
Considerations of judicial economy, comity, and fairness to parties favor a general policy of
avoiding duplicative litigation. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir.
1949). Nevertheless, a state court may not stay parallel proceedings in a federal court. See
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964). The Anti-Injunction Act of 1976 limits
the circumstances in which a federal court may stay state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1976); see Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
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generally may not decline to exercise jurisdiction merely because a
similar suit is pending in state court."0 The Supreme Court, however, has
acknowledged certain limited circumstances in which a federal district
court may stay its proceedings in deference to a state court2 In In re:
Mercury Construction Corp.,2 the Fourth Circuit recently reviewed a
federal district court's discretion to issue a stay pending resolution of a
state court suit when the federal plaintiff sought an order compelling ar-
bitration under the United States Arbitration Act (Act).
1 3
dismissed, 442 U.S. 925 (1979). A state court may stay or dismiss a suit properly before it in
deference to a prior suit in another state or federal court. See Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver,
550 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Utah 1976) (right to control docket was basis of state court discretion to
grant stay in deference to pending suit in another state court).
The question of whether the state or federal court should decide a case legitimately
before both courts is more complex when one plaintiff asserts' a federal right under a
statute, and Congress has not expressly indicated an intent to assert exclusive federal
jurisdiction over the right created. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra; Fisher, supra
note 4, at 203-07 (advocating presumption of concurrent equal jurisdiction in state and
federal courts hearing federal claims). But see Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal
Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 325 (1976) (challenging presumption
that courts should assume Congress intended concurrent jurisdiction and advocating case
by case assessment of need for exclusive federal jurisdiction when Congress is silent on
jurisdiction).
10 See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 142-43 (1908) (federal courts may no more decline
jurisdiction properly granted than usurp jurisdiction not granted). Despite the almost un-
critical acceptance of the premise of mandatory federal jurisdiction first enunciated in
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82, 100 (1821), in practice, courts often recognized ex-
ceptions to the doctrine. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 52.
The rationale for mandatory jurisdiction is the supposed absolute right to a federal
forum of a plaintiff whose action meets jurisdictional prerequisites. Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v.
Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928). The Supreme Court has recognized cer-
tain contexts that justify a federal court's refusal to exercise properly-invoked jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-25 (1979) (federal court should not hear suit
challenging state action when state forum is available in which federal plaintiff can raise
federal claims as defense); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (federal court may not
exercise jurisdiction to intervene in state criminal case if defendant can raise federal claim
as defense in state court); Gulf Ofl Corp. v. Gilbert Storage & Transfer Co., 330 U.S. 501,
508-09 (1947) (doctrine of forum non conveniens justified federal court dismissal of suit if dif-
ferent forum is more convenient for litigants); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327
(1943) (federal court should not interfere with ongoing state regulatory scheme); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1941) (federal court should remand case to
state court" for decision on pertinent state law issue when the state court resolution of
unclear state law might allow federal court to avoid deciding constitutional issue).'
" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 (1976)
(consideration of obligation to exercise federal jurisdiction in conjunction with factors
mitigating against exercise may justify federal court deference to state court even when
federal substantive law governs); see note 55 infra. The Supreme Court previously had
recognized that a federal court stay of proceedings in deference to a concurrent state court
suit could be appropriate when state law governed the substantive issues. Brillhart v. Ex-
cess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
12 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981), rehearing denied, 664 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1981).,
13 Id. at 935; see The United States Arbitration Act (Act), 9-U.S.C. § 4 (1976); note 26
infra.
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In Mercury, the transaction giving rise to the claim for arbitration
was a multi-million dollar contract for hospital additions between Mer-
cury Construction Corporation (Mercury), a Delaware corporation, and
the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (the Hospital), chartered in accor-
dance with North Carolina law. 4 The contract contained a broad arbitra-
tion clause binding both parties to arbitrate all disagreements arising
out of the contract or breach thereof, but requiring that each party sub-
mit any claim to the architect (the Architect) for resolution before invok-
ing the arbitration process. 5 Construction began in July 1975 with a
target completion date of forty months later.6 In October 1977 at the Ar-
chitect's request, Mercury agreed to withhold a claim for impending
delay and impact costs until completion of the project. 7 In January 1980
Mercury filed several claims with the Architect, and the two negotiated
the claims for several months, agreeing upon a lower figure than Mer-
cury had submitted initially.18 The Architect informed the Hospital of
the compromise on the delay and impact cost claims, and the Hospital's
attorneys began negotiating the claims with Mercury. 9 The three par-
ties met August 12, 1980, to discuss the claims, at which time Mercury
agreed to provide the Hospital with copies of Mercury's files prior to a
meeting of the three parties scheduled for October.0
On October 7, 1980, after several telephone conversations, the
Hospital warned Mercury of the Hospital's intent to file suit in North
Carolina state court seeking a declaratory judgment that Mercury had
no arbitrable claim.2' On October 8, 1980, the Hospital filed a claim
against Mercury and the Architect, a North Carolina corporation, the
North Carolina General Court of Justice.' The Hospital's complaint
alleged that Mercury had no basis for asserting a right to arbitration,
that Mercury had not demanded arbitration, that the statute of limita-
tions barred Mercury's claim, and that Mercury had waived the right to
arbitration, if a right ever existed, by failing to assert a demand for ar-
" 656 F.2d at 935 nn.1 & 3.
,5 Id at 935. The Hospital designated the Architect to act as the Hospital's represen-
tative and to review initial claims arising under the contract. Id The parties had to raise all
claims within "a reasonable time" after the disputed matter arose, and in any event, before
the applicable statute of limitations barred an action. Id.
" Id. Change orders and other problems led the parties to agree to a revised comple-
tion date of October 14, 1979. Id
17 Id. at 936. Final inspection occurred June 12, 1979, although the project was substan-
tially complete by February 1979. Id.




"' Id. In response to the Hospital's suit, Mercury ordered its attorney to file an arbitra-
tion demand, which the attorney did on October 9. Id.
' Id at 935 n.4, 936.
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bitration within a reasonable time.' On October 15, 1980, the North
Carolina court granted the Hospital's ex parte request for a temporary
injunction. The injunction barred Mercury from seeking arbitration
pending the state court trial to decide whether the contract contained a
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.' Mercury obtained an
order dissolving the injunction on October 27, 1980.1
Shortly after the Hospital filed the state claim, Mercury filed suit in
federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction and seekingan order to
compel arbitration of the disputes with the Hospital pursuant to the
United States Arbitration Act." In addition, Mercury petitioned for
Id- at 936-37. In addition to the claims against Mercury, the Hospital alleged that the
Architect had delinquently performed its duties generally, especially in not requiring
resolution of claims and disputes as they arose, and sought indemnity from the Architect if
the court determined Mercury had a valid claim. Id. at 937. The Fourth Circuit's opinion
never addressed the validity of the Hospital's claims against the Architect since the court
reasoned the Hospital added the Architect as defendant in an attempt to defeat diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 944.
2 Id. at 937. Article 45A of the General Statutes of North Carolina, adopted in 1973,
make contractual arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable in North Caro-
lina courts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (Supp. IA 1981). A court may stay arbitration pro-
ceedings commenced or threatened if one party sufficiently challenges the existence of an
arbitration agreement pending trial on the issue. Id. § 1-567.3(b). After the trial on the ques-
tion of the existence of the arbitration agreement, the court must issue an order either com-
pelling or staying arbitration. Id.
2 656 F.2d at 937.
" Id. The United States Arbitration Act (the Act) creates a federal right to enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement in a written- contract. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The Act applies
only to written provisions in maritime transactions and contracts involving commerce. Id. §
2. Commerce includes commerce among the several states or with foreign nations. Id. § 1.
The statute entitles a party to a contract, aggrieved by another party's refusal to submit to
arbitration, to a federal court order compelling arbitration if the federal court determines
that an arbitration agreement exists and one party has failed to honor the agreement. Id. §
4. Upon motion of one of the parties a federal court hearing a suit involving an arbitrable
issue shall stay further court action pending arbitration, after determining that the dispute
is arbitrable. Id. § 3. If the court finds that the existence of the arbitration agreement or a
party's refusal to honor the agreement is in dispute, the court must proceed immediately to
trial to resolve the question. Id. § 4.
The Act creates a federal right but does not create federal question jurisdiction.
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir:), cert. dismissed,
364 U.S. 801 (1959); Warren Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp. of Atlanta, Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 656, 658-59 (M.D. N.C. 1974); see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). A suit to enforce a congressional-
ly conferred right is not a sufficient basis on which to establish federal question jurisdiction.
See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (federal question jurisdiction arises
only if suit involves validity, construction, or effect of federal statute or constitutional provi-
sion and interpretation given will determine suit's result); Commercial Metals Co. v.
Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 577 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1978) (same). Plaintiffs, therefore, must
establish an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, usually diversity, to obtain a hearing
in federal court. See 577 F.2d at 268.
Congress promulgated the Act under its constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce and maritime transactions and to supervise the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. I,
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removal of the North Carolina action to federal court, which the district
court granted.2 Following removal, the Hospital petitioned the district
court for remand of the action to the North Carolina court and for a stay
of the federal court action pending resolution of the state court case.2
The district court remanded the case to state court and stayed the
federal suit pending resolution of the state court action. 29 The district
court ordered the stay because both the state and district court suits in-
volved the same issue of the arbitrability of the dispute between Mer-
cury and the Hospital." Mercury appealed the district court's decision to
stay the federal proceedings pending resolution of the state suit."
§ 8; see H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1924). The Supreme Court has held that since the primary source of congressional
authority is the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Arbitration Act created an area
of federal substantive law applicable in federal court diversity actions without regard to
state law. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405, 405 n.13 (1967);
cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (apply substantive
state law of arbitration in diversity action when transaction not in interstate commerce).
656 F.2d at 937. Section 1446 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act sets out
the procedures for removing a civil action from state court to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446
(1976 & Supp. II 1978).
' 656 F.2d at 937. A district court must remand a case to state court if the district
court decides that the district court granted removal improvidently and without proper
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).
1 656 F.2d at 937. An order remanding a case from federal to state court is not ap-
pealable, except in certain civil rights cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1976).
656 F.2d at 937.
3 Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that Mercury sought review of the stay by mandamus
as well as by direct appeal under §§ 1291 and 1292(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code.
656 F.2d at 937; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (appeal of right from final judgment); id. § 1292(a)
(interlocutory appeal). The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case as an appeal from a final judg-
ment since the court cited Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967), in support of the
decision that Mercury could appeal the district court's stay. See 656 F.2d at 937-38, 938 n.6.
The Amdur court reasoned that a stay of district court proceedings pending resolution of a
similar state court suit operated as a virtual dismissal of the proceedings, which is an ap-
pealable order. See 372 F.2d at 106; accord Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272, 1274 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1972) (district court judgment staying proceedings pending resolution of state court suit
appealable as final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)).
The Fourth Circuit in Mercury, however, confused the appealability of a district court
stay of proceedings pending arbitration with a stay pending resolution of a state suit. 656
F.2d at 938 n.6 (citing cases holding court order staying proceedings pending arbitration ap-
pealable as authority for proposition that stay pending resolution of state court suit is ap-
pealable); see, e.g., Buffier v. Electronic Computer Programming Instit., Inc., 466 F.2d 694,
696 (6th Cir. 1972) (granting preliminary injunction against arbitration proceedings ap-
pealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) as interlocutory order); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392
F.2d 368, 369 n.1 (1st Cir. 1968) (order denying stay pending arbitration appealable as prior
determination of equitable defense of arbitration in suit at law). Compare 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[4.-1] (Supp. 1980-81) (appealability of stay pending arbitration)
with 110.2014.-21 (Supp. 1980-81) (stay pending other litigation generally not appealable
order). The Mercury court correctly interpreted Fourth Circuit law in allowing Mercury to
appeal the district court order.
3 656 F.2d at 938. The Mercury court considered whether a defendant may frustrate a
plaintiff's right to arbitration by a "reactive" filing of a state court action seeking a
declaratory judgment denying arbitrability of identical claims. Id. In formulating the issues
[Vol. XXXIX
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The Fourth Circuit characterized the primary issue on appeal as the
plaintiffs right to a district court order compelling arbitration of Mer-
cury's disputes with the Hospital.12 The court first examined the plain-
tiffs right to an order compelling arbitration and then considered
whether the district court properly refused to exercise its jurisdiction in
deference to a state court proceeding on the same issue.' The Fourth Cir"
cuit noted that Mercury had established a prima facie case justifying a
court order compelling arbitration under the Act. 4 Mercury proved the
existence of a contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under
the contract and the Hospital's refusal to honor the agreement. 5 The
Fourth Circuit further found, as the Act requires, that Mercury was not
in default in proceeding with the remedy of arbitration. 6 Mercury did
in Mercury, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that although the defendant Hospital filed a
state action first, that claim arose suddenly during the course of negotiations between Mer-
cury and the Hospital. Id at 944. The court implied that the filing was an attempt to destroy
federal jurisdiction and to obtain a favorable state court ruling on the merits of the question
of arbitrability. Id at 944-45.
Id. at 938, 943.
Id at 941-42. The jurisdictional prerequisite of the Arbitration Act is a contract ex-
tending to transactions involving commerce, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), including commerce among
the several states. Id. § 1; see Prima Paint Corp. v. Floor & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
401 (1967). The contract between Mercury and the Hospital involved trade between citizens
of different states, establishing the contract as within commerce according to the usual
judicial construction of the term. 656 F.2d at 935, nn.1 & 3; see C. P. Robinson Constr. Co. v.
National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446,451 (M.D: N.C. 1974); Pathman Con-
str. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844, 852 (Ct. App. Ind. 1975). Contra Burke
County Pub. Sch. Bd. v. Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573, 575-76, 265 S.E.2d 481, 482
(1980), rev'd, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981) (prior to reversal, North Carolina courts
had ruled federal Act applied only to transactions involving or relating to actual interstate
shipment of goods); Bryant-Durham Elec. Co. v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 42 N.C. App.
351, 356, 256 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1979) (construction of county hospital not transaction in in-
terstate commerce because contract did not'specify interstate shipment of goods). The
North Carolina cases were contrary to the federal policy favoring arbitration and a broad in-
terpretation of commerce. See note 46 infra (North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted
prevalent judicial interpretation of interstate commerce).
A plaintiff seeking an order to compel, arbitration under the Federal Act must
establish two facts in addition to a contract involving interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. §§
2, 4 (1976). The plaintiff must show the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate'the
claims and the refusal of one party to arbitrate a dispute within the arbitration clause.
Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975); Warren Bros. Co. v.
Community Bldg. Corp. of Atlanta, 386 F. Supp. 656, 664 (M.D. N.C. 1974); see note 26 supra
(discussion of Act).
656 F.2d at 942.
Id at 939-41. A party in default in seeking the remedy of arbitration is not entitled
to a court order compelling arbitration or to a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration
of arbitrable issues in the suit. 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 3 (1976). The purpose of the Act and the
vigorous national policy favoring arbitration severely constrict the scope of activities that
constitute default and thus a waiver of the right to arbitration. Carolina Throwing Co. v. S.
& E. Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392
F.2d 368, 372 n.9 (1st Cir. 1968).
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's criteria for determining the circum-
stances under which a party waives the right to arbitration. 656 F.2d at 939-40; see N & D
Fashions, Inc. v. DHI Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1976). A default occurs when a party
1982]
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not waive the right to arbitration by filing a responsive pleading and
seeking removal of a state action to federal court." Mercury's delay in
pressing a claim for arbitration did not prejudice the Hospital.' The
Fourth Circuit rejected the Hospital's contention that joinder of ar-
bitrable and non-arbitrable claims justified delaying or defeating ar-
bitration of the arbitrable issues. 9 Furthermore, the court concluded
that pendency of a similar suit in state court still permits a party to
assert a right to arbitration in a federal forum.4" The Fourth Circuit held
that Mercury had a clear right to the speedy and inexpensive arbitration
procedure that the Act guarantees as a principle of substantive federal
law.41
participates in a law suit or takes other action inconsistent with the request for arbitration.
548 F.2d at 728. Waiver is an equitable principle preventing a party from asserting the right
to arbitration when that party's delay in pleading its claim diminishes the opposing party's
ability to collect evidence. Id. at 728-29. Equitable wavier does not bar arbitration, however,
because the arbitrator and not the court decides the issue. Id.
I See 656 F.2d at 940. Neither filing a responsive pleading nor seeking removal to
federal court constitutes default. Compare Carolina Throwing Co. v. S. & E. Novelty Corp.,
442 F.2d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (mechanics of filing answer and counterclaim
and seeking removal to federal court not equivalent to waiver in absence of prejudice to ob-
jecting party) and Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 412-13 (2d
Cir. 1959) (answering complaint and seeking settlement before requesting stay pending ar-
bitration not waiver when defendant filed notice of intent to arbitrate with complaint) with
E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 1040-41 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978) (party waived right to arbitration by litigating merits of case
for two and one half years before requesting arbitration).
See 656 F.2d at 940; Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 370-71 (1st Cir. 1968) (delay in
requesting stay pending arbitration that arises out of legitimate pre-arbitration discovery
not default when other party has notice of arbitration claim).
I See 656 F.2d at 940-42. The presence of non-arbitrable claims does not preclude a
court from ordering pretrial arbitration of appropriate issues that allows the trial to go for-
ward to resolve the non-arbitrable disputes. Janmort Leasing Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc.,
475 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (E.D. N.Y. 1979); accord Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
514 F.2d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1975) (court stayed trial of claims raised in third party complaint
pending arbitration, but allowed other issues to go to trial).
4 656 F.2d at 943-45; see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263,
1273-74 (7th Cir. 1976) (within federal court discretion to stay state court proceedings if
necessary to protect or effectuate federal court judgment); accord, Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v.
Baldwin, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn,
357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stay of state court proceedings justified when state
court suit involved dispute subject to Act and state court refused to apply federal law).
Compare Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, 477 F. Supp. 737, 741-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (considerations of comity do not require deference to foreign court in suit to
enforce federal right to arbitration especially when party seeks to avoid arbitration by in-
voking jurisdiction of foreign court) with E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp.
694, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (motion to stay federal court proceedings granted when federal
forum inconvenient to parties since federal court may not grant transfer of suit to amen-
able forum).
4 656 F.2d at 945-46; see note 26 supra. The Fourth Circuit stressed that Mercury had
established an independent basis of federal jurisdiction through diversity of parties. 656
F.2d at 941. In addition, Mercury had proven a contract involving interstate commerce, ac-
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After determining that Mercury had a right to invoke arbitration of
the dispute with the Hospital, the Fourth Circuit considered Mercury's
right to a federal forum in which to assert the arbitration claim.42 The
Mercury court examined the limitations on the district court's discretion
to defer to pending state proceedings when the federal plaintiff seeks
enforcement of a federal right to arbitration."3 The Fourth Circuit ex-
pressed concern that the Hospital had tried to circumvent the contrac-
tual arbitration agreement by filing a pre-emptive state court suit and
by joining the Architect as defendant to prevent removal to federal
court." The Hospital contended that the North Carolina court was com-
petent to determine whether federal or North Carolina law of arbitra-
tion applied to the controversy.45 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, fearing
that the state court would determine that the controversy did not in-
volve interstate commerce, and would, thus, apply the North Carolina
arbitration statute rather than the federal Act.46 The Fourth Circuit
cording to federal and most state court interpretations of the term. Id. at 942; see note 34
supra. Furthermore, Mercury had proven a written contract with a broad and comprehen-
sive arbitration agreement and the Hospitars refusal to arbitrate a dispute within the scope
of the arbitration agreement. Id. Establishing prima facie elements of a right to an order
compelling arbitration under the Act and a basis for federal court jurisdiction entitles the
plaintiff to a district court order compelling arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); see note 26
supra.
The Fourth Circuit characterized as "novel" the Hospital's contention that Mercury
had wavied its right to arbitration since the alleged waiver arose out of, the Architect's
negligence in deciding claims promptly when the Architect acted as the Hospital's agent. Id.
at 943. The Fourth Circuit held that since the question of whether a party has waived the
right to arbitration is one for the arbitrator to decide, Mercury was entitled to a court order
compelling arbitration. Id. at 942; see note 36 supra (distinguishing between default as ques-
tion for court to decide and waiver as question for arbitrator).
42 Id. at 942.
Id. The Mercury district court had adopted the Hospital's contention that the state
suit defeated Mercury's right to a federal forum in which to raise the claim for arbitration
under the Act. Id.
11 Id. The Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion on the district court's removal and
subsequent remand of the state court action. Id.
"I Id. Congress intended for the Act to create a substantive body of federal law ap-
plicable to arbitration agreements in contracts affecting interstate commerce whether suit
is brought in state or federal court. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1959); American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air
Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1959); 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1921 (3d ed. 1976); ABA
COMM. ON COMMERCE, TRADE & COMMERCIAL LAW, The United States Arbitration Law and
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 154 (1925) (Congress possesses ample power to declare
that arbitration agreements in contracts related to interstate commerce or admiralty trans-
actions are within interstate commerce).
State courts must apply substantive federal law when parties properly invoke the Act
to compel arbitration, even when application of state law would result in a judgment deny-
ing the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. See Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox County
Hosp. Ass'n., 326 N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ct. App. Ind. 1975).
1 656 F.2d at 942; see note 34 supra. The Hospital hoped to take advantage of North
Carolina decisions that suggested that the subject of the contract between Mercury and the
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focused on Mercury's right as a federal plaintiff to a federal forum in
which to raise the federal claim when the alternate state forum appears
unlikely to enforce that right."
The Mercury court criticized the district court's analysis of the cir-
cumstances under which a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion." In examining the standards for assessing the propriety of a district
court's deferral to state court,49 the Mercury court discussed several re-
cent decisions circumscribing a district court's discretion to stay pro-
ceedings." The Fourth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion of Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.," which applied the doctrine
set out in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.2 In Colorado River, the Supreme Court set forth the general
Hospital, additions to a county hospital, did not constitute a shipment of goods in interstate
commerce. Id.; see Burke County Pub. School Bd. v. Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573,
578, 265 S.E.2d 481, 482 (1980), rev'd 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981); Bryant-
Durham Elec. Co. v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 42 N.C. App. 351, 356, 256 S.E.2d 529, 532
(1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court in Burke County adopted the prevalent judicial
construction of the term interstate commerce, and held that transactions between citizens
of different states constitute interstate commerce. Burke County Pub. School Bd. v. Shaver
Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 415-20, 279 S.E.2d 816, 820-23 (1981). A narrow interpretation of
interstate commerce, however, frustrates Congress' intent to make the Act as widely ap-
plicable as the commerce power allows to effectuate the legislative purpose of avoiding the
delay and expense of litigation. See J. S. & H. Constr. Co. v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth.,
473 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1973); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 404-06 (2d Cir. 1959). See also C. P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Corp. for Hous.
Partnership, 375 F. Supp. 446, 450-51 (M.D. N.C. 1974) (case law defines interstate commerce
under Act broadly, including trade between citizens of different states); Pathman Constr.
Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844, 852 (Ct. App. Ind. 1975) (same). If the state
court had determined that the contract did not involve interstate commerce, North Carolina
law would have controlled. See note 34 supra.
Although the North Carolina statute governing arbitration agreements is similar to
the federal statute, compare note 24 supra with note 26 supra, the Fourth Circuit expressed
concern that the lack of case law interpreting the North Carolina statute would prejudice
Mercury's right to arbitration in advance of litigation. 656 F.2d at 945. The Fourth Circuit
particularly questioned the North Carolina court's willingness to cede the question of
waiver under the North Carolina statute to the arbitrator as the federal Act does, thus
frustrating the congressional intent to provide a speedy arbitration process bypassing
litigation. Id.
The Fourth Circuit subsequently clarified the decision in Mercury, explaining that
although the court considered whether the North Carolina court would characterize the con-
tract as the interstate or intrastate commerce, the court focused on a federal plaintiff's
right to bring a federal claim in a federal forum. 664 F.2d 936, 937 (denying rehearing of 656
F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981)).
" 656 F.2d at 944-46. The Mercury court stressed that doubts about the willingness of
the North Carolina court to enforce Mercury's federal substantive right to arbitration in-
fluenced the decision. Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 946.
'9 I& at 943.
Id. at 943-44.
51 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
656 F.2d at 943-44; Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976).
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obligation of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over cases and con-
troversies properly before it.' According to the Colorado River Court,
the obligation to exercise federal jurisdiction does not dissipate in the
face of a concurrent state court proceeding involving the same parties
and issues except under exceptional circumstances. 4 Factors for a court
to consider in evaluating the existence of exceptional circumstances in
the controversy before it include whether the state court has established
jurisdiction over the res, whether the federal forum is inconvenient to
one or more parties, whether the litigation in state court avoids piece-
meal adjudication of the issues, and whether the state court obtained
jurisdiction over the action earlier than the federal court did."
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the extent of the district court's discre-
tion to deny Mercury access to a federal forum according to the Will
Court's interpretation of the exceptional circumstances test. 6 In the Will
case, the Supreme Court reiterated that a district court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction only in limited and extraordinary situations." The
Will Court recognized that a district court has some discretion, based on
considerations of judicial economy and comity, to stay its own proceed-
424 U.S. at 813.
Id. at 813, 817.
Id. at 818. The Colorado River Court stressed that the McCarran Amendment, also
known as the McCarran Water Rights Suit Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 495, 66 Stat. 560
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)), constituted a specific grant to state courts of jurisdiction
over cases both involving the adjudication of water rights and to which the United States is
a party, when the state has developed a comprehensive system for adjudicating those
rights. 424 U.S. at 819-20. In addition to the specific congressional policy favoring state
court adjudication of water rights, the Colorado River Court identified the significance of
the absence of federal proceedings beyond the complaint stage, the involvement of 1,000
defendants in the state suit over water rights, the inconvenience to multiple parties of a
federal forum hundreds of miles away, and concurrent United States involvement in similar
litigation in other water Divisions. Id. at 820. In upholding the dismissal, however, the
Court emphasized the general obligation to exercise jurisdiction unless similar exceptional
circumstances outweigh a federal court's duty to hear cases properly before the court. Id.
' 656 F.2d at 943-45. The Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's reliance on E. C.
Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) in granting the motion to stay
its own proceeding. 656 F.2d at 945 n.21. The Ernst court applied the Colorado River stan-
dard for deciding the propriety of a district court's stay of its own proceedings pending
resolution of a state court suit. 462 F. Supp. at 700-01. The Ernst court granted the motion
to stay proceedings primarily on the basis of the inconvenience of the federal forum in New
York to the situs of the controversy in Arkansas. Id. The court added, however, that the
state court suit would avoid piecemeal litigation by deciding all the issues among all the par-
ties, but that the state court action would still be necessary if the federal suit proceeded. Id.
Finally, the court noted that the state suit had begun first and had proceeded further than
the federal action. Id. at 700. The Ernst court concluded that the Act does not expressly
preclude'a district court from staying a motion to compel arbitration pending resolution of a
state suit although the court found no cases on the precise issue. Id. at 701. The Ernst court
thus based the decision on factors the court considered exceptional within the Colorado
River standard. Id. The Fourth Circuit asserted that reliance on Ernst was inappropriate
because the same exceptional circumstances were not present in this case. Id.
5, Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-64 (1978).
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I
ings in deference to a state court under the kinds of exceptional circum-
stances identified in Colorado River.-8 On remand of the Will case, the
Seventh Circuit-9 and the district court 0 applied the Colorado River
Court's exceptional circumstances rule to justify a stay of federal court
proceedings."
The federal plaintiff in Will had filed a federal complaint concurrently
with the filing of an answer in the state court suit the plaintiff was
defending.62 The federal complaint was identical to the state court
answer, except that the federal complaint alleged a violation of Rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.3 On remand of the
Will case from the Seventh Circuit, the district court in Calvert Fire In-
surance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co.,64 justified reissuing
the stay by stressing the tenuous and contrived nature of the federal
plaintiff's federal claim, which the court characterized as a reactive,
defensive, and delaying maneuver.65 The Calvert district court, applying
Colorado River,. noted that fairness, efficiency, and the integrity of the
judicial system required the stay." The Calvert court asserted that the
stay, unlike a dismissal, still permitted the federal plaintiff access to a
federal forum. 7 The district court in Calvert concluded that Colorado
River did not deny a district court's discretion to stay proceedings, but
I' Id. at 663-64. The Will Court relied on the Colorado River decision that set forth the
exceptional circumstances in which a district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
matters involving substantive federal law. Id at 664; see text accompanying note 55 supra.
The Will Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's writ of mandamus ordering the district court
to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 666-67. The Court ruled that mandamus was an improper
remedy since a district court has discretion to stay proceedings pending resolution of a
state court controversy. Id. The decisive vote in the Will case, as the Fourth Circuit noted,
656 F.2d at 943-44, was Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion suggesting that the Seventh
Circuit should have remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of
Colorado River. 437 U.S. at 667-68.
11 Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12, 13 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The Seventh
Circuit dismissed the writ of mandamus it had previously issued and agreed with Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667-68 (1978),
that the district court should reconsider the case in light of the Colorado River doctrine. 586
F.2d at 14.
1 Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978),
affd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
01 459 F. Supp. at 862.
82 Id. at 860 (federal court complaint and state court answer filed six months after
state complaint).
Id. at 861.
459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 862-63. The district court in Calvert noted that the state defendant (federal
plaintiff) had not attempted to remove the action to federal court although it could have
done so. Id. at 862. Additionally, the Calvert district court required periodic conferences
with the parties to the federal action to-ensure that the state plaintiff expeditiously pursued
its claims in state court. Id. at 861.
Id. at 863.
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only required the district court to weigh factors supporting a stay
against the obligation to exercise jurisdiction.' The Calvert court fur-
ther found that the particular federal plaintiff failed to exercise the
right to remove the state action to federal court."9
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the Mercury case from the Calvert
case on the ground that the Mercury case lacked exceptional circum-
stances justifying the stay. 0 In Mercury, the federal plaintiff invoked a
substantive federal right central to its suit in the federal forum, and the
state court plaintiff engaged in defensive maneuvering and delaying tac-
tics by initiating the state court action.7 The Fourth Circuit held that, in
light of Colorado River, the district court in the Mercury case had abused
its discretion in issuing a stay since the district court identified no ex-
ceptional circumstances like those noted in Calvert.72
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Hall chastised the majority for ad-
dressing the merits of Mercury's claim for arbitration rather than what
the dissent perceived as the real issue before the court. 3 Judge Hall
asserted that the court should have addressed the question of which
court should decide, on the basis of the applicable statute, whether to
compel arbitration of the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital.74
The dissent noted that the issues of waiver and arbitration were properly
before each court as were the parties to the dispute, and that each court
had the statutory authority to compel arbitration if the circumstances
, Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 864.
69 Id.
70 656 F.2d at 944. The district court judge in Calvert considered Calvert's federal
claim to be a delaying tactic and defensive maneuver of the type the Supreme Court
specifically discouraged in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977), which
held that a party may not use rule 10b-5 to federalize state controversies. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 863, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
656 F.2d at 944.
" Id- at 946.
Id. at 948 (Hall, J., dissenting).
' Id The Mercury dissent stressed that when the contract involves transactions in in-
terstate commerce, federal substantive law governs the contract. I& at n.3 (Hall, J., dissent-
ing); see note 45 supra. The dissent subsequently noted that the North Carolina Supreme
Court recently emphasized that application of the substantive federal arbitration law in
state courts would discourage forum shopping among parties to a contract dispute. 664 F.2d
at 936-37 (Widener, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent argued that the nearly identical
provisions in the North Carolina and Federal Arbitration Acts minimized the danger that
North Carolina would improperly deny Mercury a right to arbitration, even if the state
court applied state and not federal law in evaluating the legitimacy of Mercury's claim. 656
F.2d at 947 (Widener, J., dissenting); see notes 24 (North Carolina Act) & 26 (Federal Act)
supra. The Mercury majority argued that the questions of waiver and estoppel previously
had not come before the North Carolina court and that the federal courts' interpretation of
the federal Act did not bind the state court to interpret a similar statute in a like manner.
656 F.2d at 945. Thus, the court was concerned that the Hospital might succeed in the at-
tempt to avoid arbitration by pursuing a state court action that might result in a jury trial,
further delaying the arbitration process. Id. at 944-45; see note 46 supra.
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justified such an order.75 The Hall dissent applied Colorado River and
concluded that the district court correctly deferred to a competent court
of prior jurisdiction, thus eliminating the possibility of duplicate or con-
flicting results.6 In reaching the conclusion, the Hall dissent applied the
same exceptional circumstances test as the majority but arrived at the
opposite result. 7 According to the dissent, the exceptional circum-
stances justifying the stay in Mercury included the priority in time of
the state suit and the state court's enhanced ability to resolve the con-
troversy fully and promptly because the state suit encompassed all the
parties to the controversy and included the Hospital's claim against the
Architect.
7 8
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of Mercury's right to arbitration under
the Act is consistent with case law in other federal and state courts79 and
with the congressional intent to establish a quick, efficient, and inexpen-
sive procedure for resolving contract disputes." The Fourth Circuit
determined that the contract between the Hospital and Mercury involved
interstate commerce," that the arbitration clause in the contract encom-
passed the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital,82 and that the
Hospital had breached the agreement to arbitrate. 3 The Fourth Circuit
71 656 F.2d at 948 (Hall, J., dissenting). The Hall dissent argued that the federal right
to arbitration of contractual disputes within the scope of the Act does not extend to
guarantee a federal forum to enforce that right when another forum is available. Id. at
949-50; see E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694, 700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (man-
datory language of 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) does not apply until court assumes jurisdiction of ac-
tion through independent basis).
"6 656 F.2d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting); see note 55 supra. Judge Hall, viewing the
Hospital's state action as a last resort after the failure of a good faith effort to resolve the
dispute by negotiation, was less suspicious of the Hospital's motives than was the majority.
Id. at 948 (Hall, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Judge Widener scolded the federal
plaintiff for failing to take advantage of the compulsory process for arbitration available to a
defendant in state court under the federal Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976), or the North Carolina
statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.3(a(c) (Supp. 1981). 656 F.2d at 947 (Widener, J., dissenting).
656 F.2d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting).
' Id. The Hall dissent in Mercury found that the state court action could provide com-
plete relief to all parties to the suit, thus avoiding piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the
state court action predated the federal suit. Id. The dissent asserted that the absence of the
other two Colorado River factors did not preclude a finding that the district court correctly
exercised its discretion in staying its proceedings pending disposition of the state action. Id.
at 950 n.5 (Hall, J., dissenting); see text accompanying note 55 supra (Colorado River fac-
tors).
9 See notes 34-39 supra.
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (Con-
gress intended speedy federal arbitration procedure not subject to judicial delay and
obstruction in courts); A.B.A. COMM. ON TRADE & COMMERCIAL LAW, The United States Ar-
bitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1925); note 46 supra.
656 F.2d at 942; see note 34 supra.
656 F.2d at 942.
3 Id.
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thus correctly concluded that Mercury had met the jurisdictional and
statutory prerequisites for obtaining a court order compelling arbitra-
tion of the dispute. 4
Following determination of Mercury's right to arbitration, the
Fourth Circuit examined Mercury's right as a state court defendant to
assert a claim for arbitration as a plaintiff in a federal forum when the
state suit encompassed the same parties and identical issues.85 The Mer-
cury court correctly applied the proper Colorado River exceptional cir-
cumstances test for justifying a district court's issuance of a stay pend-
ing resolution of similar proceedings in state court.8 The Colorado River
Court held that a district court's discretion in deciding whether to defer
to concurrent state court proceedings extends to balancing the obliga-
tion to exercise properly invoked jurisdiction with factors mitigating
against the exercise of jurisdiction. 7 The Mercury majority's application
of the exceptional circumstances standard is remarkably similar to the
Seventh Circuit's application of the standard in Bio-Analytical Services,
Inc. v. Edgewater Hospital, Inc.8
The facts of Bio-Analytical were analogous to those in Mercury. In
Bio-Analytical, the state court defendant filed suit in district court seek-
ing an order compelling arbitration under the Arbitration Act.8 9 The
federal district court dismissed the complaint finding that a party whose
joinder would defeat diversity jurisdiction was an indispensible party
whose absence mandated dismissal. The Seventh Circuit held that a
prior state court suit with jurisdiction over all parties involved in the
controversy did not justify dismissal of the federal action. In applying
the Colorado River exceptional circumstances doctrine to the facts of
the Bio-Analytical case, the Seventh Circuit stressed the difference be-
ween the McCarran Amendment and the Arbitration Act. The court em-
phasized that the McCarran Amendment indicates a federal policy of de-
ferring to state court adjudication of water rights, while the Arbitration
Act indicates a federal policy favoring a federal forum for enforcing the
federal right to arbitration. 2 The distinction was particularly critical
since the Seventh Circuit noted that the state court declined to apply
the federal Act to determine the arbitrability of the suit before it.
93
The Seventh Circuit in Bio-Analytical did not deem controlling the
' See note 41 supra.
656 F.2d at 942.
See notes 48-72 supra.
'5 424 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1976); see text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
' Id. at 452.
9 d.
'1 Id. at 453.
'5Id. at 454 n.4.
,3 Id. at 454.
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state suit's priority in time when the federal plaintiff had filed suit only
eighteen minutes after the state plaintiff. 4 The Seventh Circuit concluded
that Colorado River severely restricted the scope of a district court's
discretion to deny a state court defendant access to a federal forum as a
plaintiff invoking a federal right to arbitration. 5
The Mercury court interpreted the Colorado River exceptional cir-
cumstances doctrine in the same manner as the Seventh Circuit in Bio-
Analytical. The Fourth Circuit's assessment of the Hospital's motives in
filing a pre-emptive state suit closely resembles the Seventh Circuit's
dismissal of the priority in time factor when circumstances minimize the
importance of the time of filing. The Fourth Circuit correctly
distinguished the Mercury case, which lacked clear cut justifications for
dismissal, from the Colorado River and Calvert cases, which justified
dismissal. 7 In Mercury, the federal plaintiff had a legitimate federal right
that the state court appeared unlikely to enforce, despite a statutory
obligation to do so." Mercury promptly invoked a contractual right to ar-
bitration when the Hospital indicated an intent to discontinue negotia-
tions and filed the federal complaint shortly after the Hospital initiated
the state action.9 By contrast, the district court in Calvert characterized
the federal plaintiff's federaL claim as contrived and tangential to the
central issue in the state court case, which state law controlled. 9 The
Mercury majority contrasted the Hospital's state suit to the Calvert
federal suit and correctly refused to equate Mercury's dominant federal
claim with the Calvert plaintiff's deliberate attempt to federalize a state
claim.' Like the Bio-Analytical court, the Fourth Circuit distinguished
the McCarran Act"2 from the Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Act does
not create federal question jurisdiction, but does create a federal right
and demonstrates a federal bias in favor of arbitration, whether enforc-
ed in a state or federal forum.9 3 In applying one of the Colorado River
exceptional circumstances, the Mercury court considered the relative
convenience of the federal and state forums, and correctly concluded
that equal accessibility to federal and state forums eliminated any
justification for favoring the state forum."4
'4 Id. at 452.
's Id. at 454.
See note 41 supra.
See note 55 supra (exceptional circumstances in Colorado River) & text accompany-
ing notes 64-69 supra.
" 656 F.2d at 944.
Id. at 936-37.
'1 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
... 656 F.2d at 944.
,02 See note 55 & text accompanying note 92 supra.
,03 See note 26 supra.
,04 See E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (relative
inconvenience of federal forum primary justification for stay of federal proceedings).
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The Mercury dissent failed to recognize the gravity of the excep-
tional circumstances in the Colorado River and Calvert cases. The dis-
sent incorrectly equated the slight priority in time of the state suit in
Mercury with the ongoing state suit in Colorado River involving over '
one thousand parties. ' Thus, the Mercury dissent's assertion that the
federal court should defer to the pending state court action does not
reflect the proper application of the Colorado River exceptional, cir-
cumstances test.
The Mercury dissent correctly noted, however, that the majority
misconstrued the relative importance of establishing a jurisdictional
basis for providing a plaintiff with a federal forum prior to enforcing
that plaintiff's federal right to arbitration in the federal forum.' 6 The
Mercury court first established that Mercury had a right to arbitration
under the Act. ' The Fourth Circuit then used the existence of that
federal right to justify overruling the district court's stay of its pro-
ceedings.' 8 Since the Arbitration Act does not create federal jurisdic-
tion,' the preferable procedure would be to review the district court's
decision to determine whether the district court properly exercised its
discretion in ordering the stay, before determining the merits of a mo-
tion still at the pleading stage in both the state and federal courts.
Neither the Mercury majority nor the dissent discussed the probability
of suits involving arbitration questions becoming monuments to delay,
thus frustrating the congressional intent to avoid time-consuming and
costly litigation by providing a process for compulsory arbitration of
disputes.10
The existence of federal and state courts with concurrent jurisdic-
tion inevitably induces conflict between the two systems.'' The Mercury
case exemplifies the problems a federal court faces in determining the
deference owed to a competent state court hearing a case nearly iden-
tical to the one before the federal court. The Fourth Circuit correctly
weighed the general obligation to decide a controversy legitimately
before the court against the possibility of exceptional circumstances
justifying deference to a state court."' The Fourth Circuit properly
,0S 656 F.2d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting).
, Id at 950-51.
,I 656 F.2d at 941-42.
10 Id at 945-46.
Il See note 26 supra.
Il See Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1967); note
46 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
,,l See Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1980) (requisite exceptional cir-
cumstances present when federal policy favors state regulation of insurance industry and
state court better forum for adjudicating issues under state law, state court proceeding fur-
ther advanced than federal, and state court has jurisdiction over multiple claims against in-
solvent insurance company); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Lacrosse Mun.
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determined that Mercury did not involve the exceptional circumstances
the Colorado River Court identified as justifying a federal court's stay
pending resolution of a state suit.' The Mercury court legitimately con-
strued the policy behind the Arbitration Act as promoting the resolution
of contract disputes through arbitration rather than time-consuming and
expensive litigation."" Properly concerned that the state court might
refuse to apply the federal Act, and that application of the state statute
might result in a trial rather than an order compelling arbitration, 115 the
Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in refusing to exercise
jurisdiction. The Mercury case exemplifies the conflict inherent in a
judicial system that provides parties to a controversy with distinct
forums, when the choice of forums is potentially outcome determinative.
CATHERINE O'CONNOR
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bars Jury Trials
Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations
Under the doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity, foreign
states traditionally were immune from judicial action in the courts of
other states.' The United States followed the doctrine of absolute
foreign sovereign immunity until 1952, when the State Department
adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.' The
Transit Util., 585 F.2d 1340, 1350 (7th Cir. 1978) (mandatory arbitration provision possibly
conflicting with state statutory rights governing similar employment contracts does not
meet exceptional circumstances standard).
"' See text accompanying notes 85-101 supra.
,.. See note 46 supra.
1,1 See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
See Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in
Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 212-13 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Kahale & Vega]; von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 34-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren]. The doctrine of
absolute foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of comity between nations and
rested upon the concept of implied consent. Id. at 34-35. When a host nation permitted a
foreign sovereign to conduct activities within the host nation's territory, the host nation
theoretically waived absolute sovereignty over the foreign state within the host sovereign's
territory. Id. at 35.
2 See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign
Immunity, 85 COM. L. J. 167, 168-69 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dellapenna] (development of
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity). Chief Justice Marshall established the American
doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11
U.S. [7 Cranch] 116, 136-37 (1812). Since all sovereigns were equal under international law,
Marshall reasoned that a sovereign entering the territory of an amicable foreign govern-
ment did so in reliance on the implied promise of the host state that the host would respect
the sovereign rights and immunities of the foreign sovereign. Id. Since The Schooner Ex-
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restrictive theory provides immunity from suit for the public acts of a
foreign sovereign, but not for a foreign state's commercial activities.3
Neither the State Department nor the courts, however, established
criteria for distinguishing between public and commercial acts, or
established procedural guidelines for maintaining an action when a
foreign state-was not immune from suit.4 Thus, actual operation of the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity remained unclear.-
In 1976 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act6
(Immunities Act) to resolve confusion concerning application of the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.' The Immunities Act
codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity and
change involved foreign military vessels, the question of the immunity of foreign-owned
commercial vessels remained open. In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926),
the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity applied to
all acts of a "public purpose," including obtaining revenue for the sovereign's treasury and
advancing the trade of its citizens. Id. at 574.
Although courts initially determined the scope of foreign sovereign immunity, the view
that issues of immunity involved foreign relations implications led to gradual judicial
deference to State Department recommendations. See von Mehren, supra note 1, at 40-41.
By the middle of the 1940's, foreign sovereign immunity, although still based upon the abso-
lute theory, was regarded as a mixed legal and political question to be resolved by the ex-
ecutive branch. Id. at 41; see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-56 (1945) (question of
foreign sovereign immunity political question requiring resolution by executive branch); Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943) (judiciary obligated to accept executive
branch decisions concerning foreign sovereign immunity).
In 1952, the State Department departed from the absolute theory of foreign sovereign
immunity and adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. See Letter of
May 19, 1952 from Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate to Acting Attorney General. 26 DEP'T.
STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
711 (1976). The "Tate Letter" noted the insufficiency of the doctrine of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity in view of the widespread involvement of sovereigns in commercial ac-
tivities. See id. Several foreign states, particularly civil law jurisdictions, adopted the
restrictive theory by 1952, and the State Department anticipated that other foreign states
would adopt the restrictive theory. See id. The State Department concluded that the United
States should adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity to conform with prevalent
international practice. See id.
See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 878 (4th Cir. 1981) (discussing
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3670 (1982).
See id. The State Department failed to develop a consistent, application of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 169. Courts had
difficulty applying the restrictive theory of immunity in the absence of guidelines from the
executive department. Id. at 169; see, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 31 (1945) (noting
absence of State Department guidelines concerning immunity of vessels owned but not
possessed by foreign state); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(1964) (absent State Department criteria, courts must deny claim of immunity for acts not
strictly political or public in nature), cert. denied, 381 U.S.'934 (1965).
See Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 169; text accompanying note 4 supra.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391, 1441 (1970)).
7 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 878 (4th Cir. 1981); see Dellapenna,
supra note 2, at 169 (Immunities Act intended to resolve uncertainty surrounding restric-
tive theory); text accompanying note 5 supra.
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established standards for judicial resolution of claims of immunity The
Immunities Act established a definition of "foreign states" subject to the
provisions of the Act in section 1603 of title 28 of the United States
Code.9 For purposes of the Immunities Act, foreign states include
foreign sovereigns and certain instrumentalities of foreign states.0 In
section 1330 of title 28 of the United States Code, the Immunities Act
conferred on federal district courts original jurisdiction over all nonjury
civil actions resulting from the commercial activities of foreign states as
defined in section 1603.21 In addition, the Immunities Act amended sec-
tion 1441 of title 28 of the United States Code to include section 1441(d).
12
Section 1441(d) provides for removal by foreign states of actions origin-
ally filed in a state court to a federal district court, where the action is
, See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). The purposes of the Immunities Act are to remove
the commercial activities of foreign states from jurisdictional immunity and to leave the
determination of claims to immunity to the United States courts. Id. § 1602. To achieve the
purposes of the Immunities Act, Congress enacted §§ 1603-11, which contain comprehensive
substantive and procedural provisions for resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised
by foreign states. See id. §§ 1603-11.
U.S.C. § 1603 (1976) provides:
§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter-
(a) A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign-state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither.a citizen of a state of the United States as defined
in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third coun-
try....
Id
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
"I See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). Section 1330 provides in part:
§ 1330. Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defin-
ed in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections
1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
IM
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). Section 1441(d) provides in part:
§ 1441. Actions Removable Generally
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court
without jury....
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tried without a jury. 3 In Williams v. Shipping Corporation of India,4 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether sections 1330 and 1441(d) constitute
the exclusive jurisdictional basis for an action against a corporation
wholly owned by a foreign state'" and whether the nonjury provisions of
the Immunities Act violate the seventh amendment right to a jury'
trial.'"
In Williams, Lenwood Williams, Jr., filed suit and demanded a jury
trial in Virginia state court against the Shipping Corporation of India to
recover damages for injuries suffered while working aboard defendant's
ship. 7 Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved
to strike Williams' jury trial demand. 8 Since the Government of India
wholly owned the Shipping Corporation of India, defendant was a
foreign state under section 1603 of the Immunities Act.'9 Defendant
alleged, therefore, federal jurisdiction based upon section 1330 of the Im-
munities Act, which governs actions against foreign states.2 Since sec-
tion 1330 provided jurisdiction over Williams' action, defendant main-
tained that removal to the federal district court was proper under sec-
tion 1441(d), which provides for removal of any action against a foreign
state from state court to federal court."' Section 1441(d) precludes jury
trials in actions against foreign states as defined in section 1603." Thus,
defendant reasoned that sections 1330 and 1441(d) barred Williams' jury
trial demand.' Williams contended, however, that an alternative
jurisdictional basis to sections 1330 and 1441(d) existed which permitted
a jury trial in an action against a foreign government-owned corpora-
Is Id.
" 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3670 (1982).
,Id. at 877-81; see text accompanying notes 35-56 infra.
8 653 F.2d at 881-83; see text accompanying notes 56-68 infra.
" 653 F.2d at 876-77. Williams received personal injuries while working as a
longshoreman aboard defendant's ship. Id. at 876. Williams alleged that his injuries resulted
from defendant's negligence in maintaining the area where the accident occurred. See id.;
Brief for Appellant at 2, Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
,1 Id. at 876-77. Although defendant argued that removal was based on § 1441(d), the
removal petition contained no reference to § 1441(d). Id. at 877. See Brief for Appellant,
supra note 17, at 2. The removal petition alleged diversity of citizenship and amount in con-
troversy exceeding $10,000. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). Williams apparently be-
lieved defendant's failure specifically to assert removal under 1441(d) strengthened
Williams' position that his action was removable under § 1441(a) in conjunction with §
1332(a)(2) diversity jurisdiction. See 653 F.2d at 877. The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff's
argument. Id. at 879-81; see text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
"S See 653 F.2d at 876; 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976); note 9 supra ("foreign state" includes
any corporation owned or controlled by a foreign sovereign).
1 653 F.2d at 877. Section 1330 specifically incorporates the § 1603 definition of
"foreign states." See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976); note 11 supra.
" 653 F.2d at 877; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); note 12 supra.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); note 12 supra.
See 653 F.2d at 877.
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tion.24 Reasoning that defendant was a "citizen or subject of a foreign
state," Williams argued that the federal district court had diversity
jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2) of title 28 of the United States
Code.' Section 1332(a)(2) grants federal district courts original jurisdic-
tion over actions by citizens of a State against citizens or subjects of a
foreign state.26 Since section 1332(a)(2) provided jurisdiction over defen-
dant, Williams reasoned that his action was removable to federal district
court under section 1441(a) of title 28 of the United States CodeY Section
1441(a) applies to actions removed from state court to federal court by
defendants in general and does not proscribe a jury trial in the federal
court.8 Reasoning that sections 1332(a)(2) and 1441(a) provided an alter-
native basis of jurisdiction, Williams contended that the court should
grant his jury trial demand. 9 Alternatively, Williams asserted that the
Immunities Act violated his seventh amendment right to a jury trial."
24 Id. at 880. Williams cited two district court decisions that permitted alternative
jurisdiction in actions against foreign government-owned corporations. IM at 880; see
generally Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660
F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1981); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979). In
Icenogle, the district court permitted diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over a foreign
government-owned airline under § 1332(a)(2) and granted a jury trial. 82 F.R.D. at 37. In Rex
the plaintiff sued a foreign government-owned corporation under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). 493 F. Supp. at 460. The district court
asserted § 1331 federal question jurisdiction and permitted a jury trial. Id- at 467. After the
Williams decision, however, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's holding in Rex
and denied a jury trial under § 1330. Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3rd
Cir. 1981); see note 86 infra.
' 653 F.2d at 877, 880; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
' 653 F.2d at 877, 880. Section 1441(a) provides that, except as otherwise established
by Act of Congress, a defendant may remove from state court to federal district court any
civil action over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1976). Williams reasoned that § 1441(a) applied to removal of his action from state court
since the district court had original jurisdiction under § 1332. 653 F.2d at 877, 880; see
Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D. Va. 1980) (diversity of citizenship basis for
removal under § 1441(a)).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
29 653 F.2d at 877, 880; see Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-3, Williams v. Shipping Corp.
of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Appellant].
Williams urged the Fourth Circuit to adopt a jurisdictional avenue which afforded him a
jury trial. Id. Williams argued that §§ 1332(a)(2) and 1441(a) enabled the court to grant his
jury trial demand consistent with the Immunities Act. See Brief for Appellant, supra note
17, at 19. Although the Immunities Act precludes jury trials against foreign states, Williams
reasoned that the Immunities Act preserved jury trials in actions against entities which
were also citizens or subjects of a foreign state under § 1332(a)(2). Id. Williams maintained
that the Fourth Circuit must base removal of Williams' action on § 1441(a) and grant a jury
trial to avoid the seventh amendment issue that the nonjury provisions of the Immunities
Act posed. See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra, at 3.
o 653 F.2d at 877; see Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 1-3; text accompany-
ing notes 57-68 infra.
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The district court rejected Williams' argument and held that sec-
tions 1330 and 1441(d) provide the exclusive source of jurisdiction for ac-
tions against foreign sovereigns or their instrumentalities.31 According-
ly, the district court dismissed Williams' jury trial demand.2 Williams
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.3 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that sections 1330 and 1441(d) provide the sole basis of
jurisdiction in actions against foreign government-owned corporations.
4
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision barred Williams' jury trial de-
mand, the Williams court concluded that application of the Immunities
Act to Williams' action did not violate Williams' seventh amendment
rights.35
In determining that sections 1330 and 1441(d) constitute the sole
jurisdictional basis in an action against a foreign government-owned cor-
poration, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the history and scope of the Im-
munities Act. 6 The Williams court noted that the legislative history of
the Immunities Act indicates congressional intent to codify the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity and to aid resolution of claims of
foreign sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that to imple-
ment the legislative scheme of the Immunities Act, Congress modified
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts by enacting
section 1330.38 Since section 1330 provides that federal district courts
have original jurisdiction over any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603, the Williams court concluded that Con-
gress intended section 1330 to govern all actions against foreign states.39
"' See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 1980),
affd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
489 F. Supp. at 532; see 653 F.2d at 877.
See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
- Id. at 883; see text accompanying notes 36-56 infra.
653 F.2d at 883; see text accompanying notes 57-68 infra.
See 653 F.2d at 877-81; text accompanying notes 1-5 supra (development of United
States' policy of foreign sovereign immunity); text accompanying notes 37-45 and 52-56 infra
(examining scope of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 & 1441(d) (1976)).
1 653 F.2d at 878; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-8, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6604-06 [hereinafter cited as House Report] (pur-
poses of Immunities Act); S. REP. No. 94-1310 at 8-9, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report] (objectives of Immunities Act); text accompanying
notes 7-8 supra.
653 F.2d at 878-79; see text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). Section 1330 confers original jurisdiction over "foreign
states" regardless of the amount in controversy. Id. Section 1330 applies to all claims for
relief in personam arising from activities for which a foreign state is not immune under
other provisions of the Immunities Act. IM; see notes 9 & 11 supra. The Report of the House
Judiciary Committee stated that section 1330 establishes a broad, comprehensive jurisdic-
tional scheme concerning actions against foreign states. See House Report, supra note 37, at
12-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6611. Congress perceived broad
federal jurisdiction as conducive to uniform treatment of cases involving foreign states.
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The Fourth Circuit suggested further that Congress' amendment of
the diversity jurisdiction provisions in section 1332 evinced congres-
sional intent to establish section 1330 as the exclusive source of jurisdic-
tion over foreign government-owned corporations." Before enactment of
the Immunities Act, section 1332(a)(2) provided federal district courts
original jurisdiction in all civil actions between citizens of a State and
foreign states or citizens or subjects of a foreign state, where the
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.41 The Fourth Circuit noted that
in addition to enacting section 1330, the Immunities Act eliminated
reference in section 1332(a)(2) to foreign states as defendants.42 Congress
added a new subsection to section 1332 providing diversity jurisdiction
only when the plaintiff is a foreign state under section 1603."3
The Williams court found additional support for its interpretation of
the Immunities Act in Reports of the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees, which specifically stated that section 1332 is unnecessary as a
basis of jurisdiction for actions against foreign states in light of the com-
prehensive jurisdictional scheme provided under section 1330."4 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that deletion of the phrase "foreigo states"
from section 1332(a)(2) and inclusion of foreign states in section 1330 indi-
cated Congress' intent to eliminate diversity jurisdiction in actions
against all foreign states and instrumentalities within the scope of sec-
tion 1603."
House Report, supra note 37, at 12-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6611. Congress believed uniformity of decision in actions against foreign states would pre-
vent adverse foreign relations which might result from disparate treatment of foreign
states. House Report, supra note 37, at 12-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6611.
"0 See House Report, supra note 37 at 12-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6611.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976)). Before
enactment of the Immunities Act, diversity jurisdiction governed actions against foreign
government-owned corporations, which were regarded as citizens or subjects of the parent
state. See, e.g., Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882) (corporation created by
laws of foreign country regarded as citizen of foreign state for purpose of federal diversity
jurisdiction); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 534 (2d
Cir.) (diversity of citizenship over foreign government-owned airline), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
983 (1965).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). The Immunities Act preserved diversity jurisdic-
tion in actions by a citizen of one of the United States against "citizens or subjects of a
foreign state." See id. Diversity jurisdiction also remains in actions between United States
citizens in which citizens or subjects of foreign states are additional parties. See id. §
1332(a)(3) (1976).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976); note 9 supra.
" 653 F.2d at 880; see House Report, supra note 37, at -14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6613 (diversity jurisdiction over foreign states superfluous because §
1330 contains broad jurisdictional grant); Senate Report, supra note 37, at 13 (§ 1330 renders
diversity jurisdiction over foreign states unnecessary).
,1 653 F.2d at 878-81.
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In rejecting Williams' argument that he could have sued originally in
federal district court under section 1332(a)(2),' the Williams court
adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning in Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana De Vapores18 In Ruggiero, plaintiffs alleged diversity jurisdic-
tion under section 1332(a)(2) and demanded jury trials in personal injury
actions against a foreign government-owned shipping company." The Se-
cond Circuit, however, held that Congress intended the jurisdictional
provisions of the Immunities Act to provide the sole basis of jurisdiction
in actions against foreign government-owned corporations.48 Since the
defendant in Ruggiero was a foreign state under the Immunities Act, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the defendant could not also be a citizen or
subject of a foreign state under section 1332(a)(2). 9 Thus, the Ruggiero
court concluded that section 1330 constitutes the exclusive source of
original federal jurisdiction for actions against foreign government-
owned corporations.-" In addition, the Second Circuit suggested that the
" See 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981). At the time of the Williams decision, Ruggiero was
the sole circuit court opinion to consider the scope of the jurisdictional provisions of the Im-
munities Act. But see note 86 infra (3rd Circuit addressing jurisdictional issue after the
Williams decision). Although several district courts had addressed the jurisdiction issue,
the district courts were divided over application of § 1330 and § 1441(d). See text accom-
panying notes 87-92 infra. Williams argued that the definition of "foreign state" in § 1603
does not extend to § 1332 because § 1332 contains no cross-reference to § 1603. See 653 F.2d
at 880. In addition, plaintiff suggested that the § 1603 definition does not apply to § 1332,
because § 1603 specifically applies only to Chapter 97 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
and § 1332 is located in Chapter 85 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Id. at 880-81.
Williams claimed, therefore, that his action was against a "citizen or subject of a foreign
state" under § 1332(a)(2) rather than against a "foreign state" under § 1330. Id. The Fourth
Circuit rejected Willams' "hypertechnical analysis" of the Immunities Act, emphasizing that
the jurisdictional provisions of the Act specifically refer to the § 1603 definition of foreign
state. Id. Since amendment of § 1332 deleted reference to foreign states, a cross-reference
to the § 1603 definition is unnecessary. See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639
F.2d at 875 n.6.
4 See 639 F.2d at 873.
"Id. at 875-76. InRuggiero, the Second Circuit thoroughly examined the language and
legislative history of the Immunities Act to hold that Congress established § 1330 and §
1441(d) as the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle against foreign states and their entities. Id. at
875-77. The Ruggiero court concluded that Congress intended that procedures governing
suits against foreign states parallel procedures governing actions against the United States.
Id. at 878; see Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Seventh Amendment Recogniz-
ing the Right to Jury Trial in Suits Against Foreign States and State-Owned Corporations,
21 VA. J. INT'L L. 521, 535 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Sovereign] (congressional in-
tent to conform procedures for suits against foreign states with procedures for actions
against United States).
" 639 F.2d at 875. The Ruggiero court noted that the traditional justification for re-
garding foreign corporations as citizens of their state of incorporation was that courts
regarded suits against a corporation as against the shareholders, who were citizens or-sub-
jects of the state of incorporation. Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that Congress
eliminated the legal fiction for foreign government-owned corporatibns by treating foreign
corporations like their controlling shareholders-foreign sovereigns. Id
0' 639 F.2d at 875.
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Immunities Act established section 1441(d) as the exclusive provision for
removal by foreign states of actions filed in state courts.5'
In denying Williams' jury demand, the Fourth Circuit rejected
Williams' argument that section 1441(a) governed removal of Williams'
action from the state court instead of section 1441(d).2 Section 1441(d)
establishes the right of a foreign state to remove to a federal district
court an action filed in a state court. 3 Since section 1441(d) requires a
nonjury trial upon removal of an action, removal of a suit from, state to
federal court under section 1441(d) extinguishes a jury trial demand
made at the state level.5 4 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that section
1441(d) reflects legislative intent that only judges act as triers of fact in
actions against foreign states.55 Thus, the Williams court concluded that
sections 1330 and 1441(d) constitute the exclusive jurisdictional avenue
for suits against foreign states and bar a jury trial whether the action is
removed from the state court or filed originally in federal district
court.56
Noting that the seventh amendment gurantees a defendant the right
to a jury trial only where a jury trial was available in "suits at common
law," the Fourth Circuit also rejected Williams' contention that the Im-
munities Act violated his seventh amendment right to a jury trial.7 In
Parsons v. Bedford,8 the Supreme Court held the phrase "suits at com-
mon law" to refer to all actions involving rights and remedies enforced
51 See id. at 876 n.7, 878. The Ruggiero court noted that Congress intended § 1330 and
§ 1441(d) to provide a single avenue for suing foreign sovereigns or their instrumentalities
and to bar jury trials in all actions against such defendants. Id. at 878. The Williams court
concluded that the rationale of Ruggiero, concerning an action filed originally in federal
court, also governed an action removed by a foreign defendant from state court. See 653
F.2d at 880 n.4. Indeed, the conclusion that the Immunities Act exclusively governs actions
against foreign states appears stronger in actions removed from state court by a foreign
state. As the Ruggiero court noted, both § 1330 and § 1441(d) refer to nonjury trials in civil
actions against defendants falling within the § 1603 definition of foreign state. 639 F.2d at
878. Although the language of § 1330 implicitly bars a jury trial, the statutory language of §
1441(d) unequivocally denies a jury trial. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of any nonjury civil action .... ) with 28 U.S.C. §
1441(d) ("Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without a jury.")
653 F.2d at 880-81; see note 29 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); see note 12 supra.
See House Report, supra note 37, at 33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6632.
' 653 F.2d at 879; see text accompanying notes 81-84 infra (rationale for barring jury
trials in actions against foreign states); cf. text accompanying notes 105-109 infra (policy con-
siderations favoring denial of jury trials against foreign states).
653 F.2d at 881.
5 Id. at 881-82. The seventh amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in "suits
at common law," where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. U.S. CONST.
amend. VII; see Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n;
430 U.S. 442, 459 (1977) (jury trial required only where required at common law).
28 U.S. [3 Pet.] 441 (1830).
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under the common law in 1791, the date of enactment of the seventh
amendment. 9 Relying upon Parsons, Williams contended that the
seventh amendment guaranteed his right to a jury trial because his
cause of action rested on common law tort theory." The Fourth Circuit
rejected Williams' argument, reasoning that an action also must be
brought against a defendant suable at common law.6 Under the common
law in 1791, a foreign state was immune from all suits without the
foreign sovereign's consent.2 The Williams court also compared a
foreign sovereign's immunity from jury trial with the sovereign immuni-
ty of the United States."3 Courts consistently uphold denial of jury trials
in actions against the United States because the United States, as
sovereign, was not suable at common law without the government's con-
sent." Moreover, even if the United States consents to suit, Congress
has the power to prescribe the manner in which the action proceeds.-
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the same rationale applies to actions
against foreign states, since suits against, foreign states also were
Id. at 446-48. In Parsons v. Bedford, the Supreme Court construed the seventh
amendment to embrace all suits involving legal rights enforceable at common law, as op-
posed to equitable or admiralty rights. Id. at 447; see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363, 376 (1974) (seventh amendment guarantees right to jury trial in action for recovery of
possession of real property because comparable action triable by jury in 1791); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) (action for damgaes under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976), requires jury trial under seventh amendment since cause of action
analogous to common law tort action).
653 F.2d at 883; Brief for Appellant, supra ntoe 17, at 14-17.
653 F.2d at 883.
Id. at 881-82; see Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 168-69 (traditional absolute immunity
of foreign sovereigns); Kahale & Vega, supra note 1, at 212 (former United States policy of
absolute foreign sovereign immunity); von Mehren, supra note 1, at 34-35 (historial practice
of absolute foreign sovereign immunity).
' 653 F.2d at 882. Chief Justice Marshall suggested an analogy between foreign
sovereign immunity and domestic foreign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fad-
don, 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 116, 136-39 (1812). The concept of foreign sovereign immunity rests
upon the theory that a nation, possessing absolute sovereignty and power within its own
territory, should afford foreign sovereigns within the host nation's territory the same ex-
emptions enjoyed by the host sovereign. Id.; see text accompanying note 2 supra, & notes
100-104 infra.
" See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2702 n.9 (1981) (seventh amendment
right to jury trial never applied to action against United States), Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 572 (1961) (suits against the United States not suits at common law subject to
seventh amendment); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943) (no right to assert
claim against sovereign under common law in 1791); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S.
426, 440 (1880) (suits against government' not suits at common law within meaning of
seventh amendment).
I See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (i880). The McElrath court'noted
that a sovereign can determine the form and procedures to govern suits to which it con-
sents. Id. at 440; see United States v. Sherwood, 321 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941) (sovereign has
power to impose conditions when consenting to suit).
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unknown at common law.6 Accordingly, the Williams court concluded
that Congress has the power to restrict the right to a jury trial in an ac-
tion against a foreign state. 7 Thus, the Williams court held that denial of
a jury trial under the Immunities Act did not violate Williams' seventh
amendment rights. 8
The statutory language and legislative history of the Immunities
Act support the Fourth Circuit's holding that Congress intended the Im-
munities Act to provide the exclusive jurisdictional basis for actions
against foreign government-owned corporations. 9 Williams' claim that
he could have sued originally in federal court based upon diversity
jurisdiction ignored the implications of section 1330. Before 1976, sec-
tion 1332 diversity jurisdiction governed actions against both foreign
states and foreign government-owned corporations." Congress enacted
section 1330 to provide original federal jurisdiction over actions against
foreign states and amended section 1332 to eliminate reference to
foreign states as defendants.2 Although the Immunities Act preserved
reference to citizens or subjects of a foreign state in section 1332, Con-
gress could not have intended that section 1332 continue to provide
jurisdiction in actions against foreign government-owned corporations."
Section 1603 defines foreign states specifically to include foreign
government-owned corporations. 4 As the Second Circuit emphasized in
Ruggiero, the same entity cannot be both a foreign state and a citizen or
subject of a foreign state. 5 Since section 1330, which incorporates the
section 1603 definition of foreign states, encompasses all nonjury civil ac-
" 653 F.2d at 882. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the same concern for amicable
foreign relations that influenced the common law theory of absolute foreign sovereign im-
munity influenced Congress' decision to bar jury trials when it established jurisdiction over
actions against foreign states. Id.; see text accompanying notes 105-109 infra.
87 653 F.2d at 882-83; see text accompanying notes 100-104 infra.
653 F.2d at 882-83.
69 See text accompanying notes 70-84 infra.
o See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976); text accompanying notes 71-78infra.
' See Note, Jurisdiction and Jury Trials in Actions Against Foreign Government
Owned Corporations, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1211, 1211' & n.1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Jurisdiction and Jury Trials] (traditional diversity jurisdiction over foreign government-
owned corporations); text accompanying note 41 supra (diversity jurisdiction over foreign
government-owned corporations before enact.ment of Immunities Act).
72 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332 (1976); text accompanying notes 38-45 supra, & notes
73-77 infra.
See 653 F.2d at 880-81; text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
7' See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). Section 1603 defines "foreign state" to include a cor-
porate entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state ..." Id. § 1603(b)(2). To come within the § 1603 definition of foreign state, however, a
foreign corporation cannot also be a citizen of the United States under § 1332(c) and (d). Id- §
1603(b)(3).
"5 See 639 F.2d at 875; text accompanying note 49 supra. Cf. Petroleum Exploration,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 217 (1938) (State cannot also be citizen of State for
purpose of diversity jurisdiction).
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tions against foreign states and their instrumentalities, Congress had no
reason to preserve an alternative jurisdictional basis under section
1332.76 In addition, the legislative history of the Immunities Act in-
dicates that Congress considered diversity jurisdiction over foreign
states and foreign government-owned corporations superfluous after
enactment of section 1330.:1 Since statutory language and legislative
history of a statute control a court's interpretation of legislative intent,
the Fourth Circuit properly concluded that Congress intended to ex-
tinguish diversity jurisdiction over foreign states as broadly defined in
section 1603.6
Similarly, the language and legislative history of section 1441(d) sup-
port the Williams court's holding that the Immunities Act bars jury
trials against foreign government-owned corporations. Section 1441(d)
states that actions removed from a state court will be tried in the
federal district court without a jury. 9 The legislative history of the Im-
munities Act expresses Congress' recognition that removal of actions
under section 1441(d) extinguishes a jury trial demand made in state
court." In addition, the legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended actions removed by a foreign state or its instrumentalities to be
tried without a jury to insure uniformity of decision.6 Since the commer-
cial activities of foreign states and their agencies often have political im-
plications, actions against foreign sovereigns or their instrumentalities
frequently involve a sensitive combination of political and legal consi-
derations. 2 Congress observed that uniformity of decision would
78 See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of'India, 653 F.2d 875, 881 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero
v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1981). In Ruggiero, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the Immunities Act created a new type of jurisdiction applying ex-
clusively to actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities. 639 F.2d at 876. The
Second Circuit concluded that the jurisdictional provisions of the Immunities Act apply ex-
clusively to all actions against foreign states and bar jury trials even if an action meets the
technical requirements of one of the other jurisdictional categories. Id
" See House Report, supra note 37, at 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6613. Discussing the deletion of "foreign states" from § 1332(a)(2) and (3), the House
Report noted that the comprehensive jurisdictional scheme in § 1330 eliminated the need
for diversity jurisdiction over foreign states. House Report, supra note 37, at 14, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6613; see Senate Report, supra note 37, at 13-14.
,1 See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 535 (1943) (legisla-
tive intent determined primarily from statutory language); United States v. N. E. Rosen-
blum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53-55 (1942) (interpretation of legislative intent derived
from statutory language and purpose); McClain v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 527, 530 (1941)
(language and legislative history control statutory construction).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); see note 12 supra.
'o See House Report, supra note 37, at 32-33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6631-32; Senate Report, supra note 37, at 32.
"1 See House Report, supra note 37, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6631; Senate Report, supra note 37, at 32.
1 See Foreign Sovereign, supra note 48, at 530, 535.
1982]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
mitigate the sensitivity of suits against foreign states. 3 To circumvent
potential problems of disparate treatment by state courts, Congress
added section 1441(d) to require that actions against foreign states and
their instrumentalities be tried in a federal forum by a judge without a
jury.
8 4
Other circuit court decisions considering the scope of the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the Immunities Act also provide persuasive support
for the Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams." After thoroughly examin-
ing the language and legislative history of the Immunities Act, circuit
courts generally have concluded that Congress intended the Immunities
Act to provide the exclusive source of jurisdiction over actions against
foreign states as broadly defined by the Immunities Act." Similarly,
several district court decisions have interpreted the jurisdictional sec-
tions of the Immunities Act to supersede other bases of jurisdiction over
foreign states and their instrumentalities. 7 Although some district
courts have upheld jury trial demands against foreign sovereigns by per-
mitting alternative sources of jurisdiction,88 no federal district court
I See House Report, supra note 37, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6631 (sensitive nature of actions against foreign sovereigns requires uniformity
among judicial decisions); Senate Report, supra note 37, at 52 (sensitive foreign relations
favor uniformity of decision); Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 497 (uniformity desirable because
of sensitive foreign policy considerations); Foreign Sovereign, supra note 48, at 535 (lack of
uniformity may have adverse foreign relations effect).
84 See House Report, supra note 37, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6611-12, 6632; Senate Report, supra note 37, at 11-12, 32; text accompanying notes
105-109 infra (policy considerations favoring denial of jury trial in actions against foreign
states).
' See Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, 660 F.2d 61, 62-69 (3rd Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v.
Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 873-81 (2d Cir. 1981).
" See Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, 660 F.2d 61, 62-69 (3rd Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v.
Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 873-81 (2d Cir. 1981). In Ruggiero, the Second
Circuit rejected § 1332(a)(2) diversity jurisdiction as an alternative jurisdictional source to
the Immunities Act. 639 F.2d at 875; see text accompanying notes 46-50 supra. Similarly,
after Williams, the Third Circuit in Rex refused to base jurisdiction over a foreign
government-owned corporation on § 1331 federal question jurisdiction. 660 F.2d at 64-65.
Plaintiff in Rex filed suit for damages under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) and demanded a jury trial, alleging both diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(2) and federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.
660 F.2d at 62. Examining the Ruggiero and Williams decisions and the statutory language
and legislative history of the Immunities Act, the Third Circuit concluded that the Im-
munities Act eliminated both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction over
foreign government-owned corporations. See id. at 62-65.
87 See, e.g., Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 510 F. Supp. 737, 738 (E.D. La.
1981) (jury trial demand denied in personal injury suit against foreign government-owned
corporation because jurisdiction based upon § 1330); Herman v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,
502 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no alternative jurisdictional basis for action removed
under § 1441(d)); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 941 F. Supp. 1260, 1261-62 (E.D. Va.
1980) (no right to jury trial where jurisdiction over foreign government-owned shipping cor-
poration rested on § 1330).
1 See, e.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71, 75 (D. Md. 1980) (jury
trial granted under § 1332(a)(2) diversity jurisdiction in action against government-owned
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decision supports jury trials in an action removed from a state court.89
Several district courts noted that section 1441(d) expressly precludes a
jury trial in any action removed to federal court from a state court. In
addition, the district courts adopting an alternative basis of jurisdiction
indicated that their rationale was to avoid constitutional issues arising
from section 1330's denial of a jury trial.9 The Williams court, however,
could not avoid the constitutional question since removal of actions
against foreign states under section 1441(d) specifically bars jury trials.
In addressing Williams' seventh amendment argument, the Fourth
Circuit noted correctly that the seventh amendment does not require a
jury trial where none was required at common law. 3 Several Supreme
Court cases have interpreted "suits at common law" to include actions
involving rights analogous to legal rights recognized at common law. 4
The Supreme Court holds consistently, however, that the seventh
amendment applies only to defendants suable at common law. 5 Since
foreign sovereigns were not suable under the common law, no right to a
shipping company); Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao Lloyd Basiliero, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (jury trial demand granted under § 1332(a)(2) diversity jurisdiction in ler-
sonal injury action against foreign government-owned corporation); Icenogle v. Olympic Air-
ways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D.D.C. 1979) (jury trial requests granted under § 1332(a)(2)
diversity jurisdiction in wrongful death actions against foreign government-owned airline).
Williams specifically relied upon the reasoning of Icenogle. See Williams v. Shipping Corp.
of India, 653 F.2d 875, 880 (4th Cir. 1981). The Icenogle court reasoned that Congress intend-
ed to preserve § 1332(a)(2) as a jurisdictional avenue against foreign government-owned cor-
porations since the Immunities Act retained the reference to citizens or subjects of a
foreign state while deleting reference to foreign states. See 82 F.R.D. at 37-38.
', See, e.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shippinj Co., 87 F.R.D. 71, 72 (D. Md. 1980) (action
originally filed in federal district court); Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao Lloyd Basiliero,
85 F.R.D. 71, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (suit filed in federal district court); Icenogle v. Olympic Air-
ways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D.C. 1979) (case originally filed in federal court).
" See e.g., Herman v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 502 F. Supp. 277, 279 & n.4, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (recognizing § 1441(d), which expressly bars jury trials, as exclusive source
of jurisdiction in actions removed by foreign states); Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao
Lloyd Basiliero, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (no right to jury trial in actions removed to
federal court under § 1441(d)); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 39 & n.7
(D.D.C. 1979) (§ 1441(d) requires nonjury trial in actions removed from state court).
1 See, e.g., Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao Lloyd Basiliero, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (no need to consider seventh amendment issue where § 1332(a)(2) permits jury
trial); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 39-40 (jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(2)
avoids inquiry into constitutionality of jurisdictional provisions of Immunities Act barring
jury trial).
" See 653 F.2d at 881-83; text accompanying notes 57-68 supra.
,2 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; text accompanying notes 57-68 supra.
94 See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1974); Curtis,v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 193-95 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. [3 Pet.] 444, 446-47 (1830); text accom-
panying note 59 supra.
95 See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2692, 2702 n.9 (1981); Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943);
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1980); text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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jury trial against a foreign sovereign existed in 1791.11 The issue
whether immunity extended to foreign government-owned corporations
never arose because such entities did not exist at the time of the seventh
amendment's adoption.97 Since the absolute theory of foreign sovereign
immunity did not distinguish between public and commercial acts of
foreign governments, foreign sovereign immunity arguably would have
extended to government-owned corporations." Therefore, the Williams
court's conclusion that no right to a jury trial against a foreign
government-owned corporation existed at common law appears sound. 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly upholds the denial of jury
trials in suits against the United States on the ground that suits against
the sovereign did not exist at common law in in 1791."00 Similarly, suits
against foreign sovereigns were unknown in 1791.11 Although foreign
sovereign immunity rests upon principles different from domestic
sovereign immunity, the power of Congress to declare immunity exists
in both situations.' 2 Congress possesses authority to confer absolute
sovereign immunity on foreign states and instrumentalities. 1 3 In light of
Congress' authority to exempt foreign states and instrumentalities from
all liability, Congress arguably possesses authority to restrict the im-
munity of foreign states by permitting actions against foreign states,
subject to procedural limitations.'
See text accompanying notes 1 & 2, 62 supra.
See Jurisdiction and Jury Trials, supra note 71, at 1223 (foreign government-owned
corporations nonexistent at common law).
" See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 569-74 (1926). Berizzi involved an
action against a merchant vessel owned by a foreign state. Id. The Berizzi Court concluded
that the principle of foreign sovereign immunity extended to all activities pursued for a
public purpose including the advancement of trade. Id. at 574.
See 553 F.2d at 881-82; text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
'® See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
'o' See text accompanying notes 1 & 2, 62 supra.
See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 880 & n.11 (2d Cir.
1981) (different bases for domestic and foreign sovereign immunity); text accompanying
note 2 supra (traditional bases of foreign and domestic sovereign immunity). Congress has
authority under Article I, sec. 8, cl. 9 and Article III, sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution to
establish the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 1.
Congress has authority to set the conditions for suits to which the United States consents.
See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941).
Congressional authority for prescribing terms of suits against against foreign
sovereigns flows from several sources. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 1 (power to
define jurisdiction of federal courts); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3 (power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (power to define offenses against
"Law of Nations"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (power to enact all laws "necessary and pro-
per" to carry out the powers of the United States government); House Report, supra note
37, at 12, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6611 (constitutional authority
for enacting the Immunities Act).
" See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 116, 136-37 (1812)
(power of host nation to exempt foreign sovereigns from jurisdiction of host sovereign).
104 See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 880 (2d Cir. 1981)
(ability of Congress to limit immunity of foreign states and place restrictions on form of
suit); note 102 supra.
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Sound policy considerations also support the denial of jury trials in
actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities. A lack of
uniform treatment of foreign states or their instrumentalities by United
States courts could have an adverse impact on foreign relations.,
Foreign states with legal systems which do not employ jury trials might
object to trial by jury in the United States."6 In addition, national preju-
dice or hostility toward a particular foreign nation is more likely to influ-
ence a jury than a judge. 1' Finally, the possibility exists that juries will
award excessive damages when confronted with the "deep pocket" of a
foreign sovereign defendant."8 Thus, rational policy considerations sup-
port the Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams."9
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Shipping Corpora-
tion of India evidences a trend among the federal circuit courts to uphold
section 1330 as the exclusive jurisdictional basis for actions against
foreign states and their instrumentalities and to deny jury trials in all
such actions.10 While other federal courts may adopt an alternative
jurisdiction approach, acceptance of alternative jurisdictional avenues to
the Immunities Act appears unlikely in light of circuit court precedent."'
The Fourth Circuit's thorough analysis of the statutory language and
legislative history of the Immunities Act demonstrates that Congress
did not intend to preserve alternative sources of jurisdiction over
foreign government-owned corporations."2 After Williams, actions
brought in the Fourth Circuit against a foreign state or its instrumen-
talities will be tried without a jury, whether the action originates in
federal district court or is removed to federal court from a state court."'
PAMELA L. RYAN
"' See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
See Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d at 880 (2d Cir. 1981).
' See id at 880 & n.12; Jurisdiction and Jury Trials, supra note 71, at 1221. Most
foreign countries do not use a civil jury. 639 F.2d at 880. Although some foreign states
might object to trial by jury, the Ruggiero court reasoned that most foreign nations may be
less likely to object to trial by a judge in commercial cases since the United States govern-
ment is subject to similar procedures in commercial actions. Id.
"' See 639 F.2d at 880 & n.12; Jurisdiction and Jury Trials, supra note 71, at 1221.
" See 639 F.2d at 880; Foreign Sovereign, supra note 48, at 526. A traditional justifica-
tion for the United States' refusal to submit to a jury trial is the fear that juries will award
excessive judgments. See 639 F.2d at 880; Foreign Sovereign, supra note 48, at 526.
"o See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 supra.
See text accompanying notes 85 & 86, 91 supra. Since the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial is a fundamental right, constitutional challenges to the jurisdictional provi-
sions may continue. See Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 500-01 (since jury trial basic right, con-
troversy over nonjury provisions of Immunities Act may require Supreme Court
resolution). But see text accompanying notes 85-87 supra (circuit and district court prece-
dent holding Immunities Act exclusive source of jurisdiction over foreign government-
owned corporations).
1' See text accompanying notes 70-84 supra.
"M See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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C. The Younger Doctrine Applied to an Administrative Decision
Pending in State Court
Congress long has limited the extent to which federal courts can in-
terfere with state judicial proceedings.' Since 1793, an anti-injunction
statute, codified at section 2283 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
has barred the granting of federal injunctions to stay state proceedings.2
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871' falls under an express ex-
ception to section 2283 and provides an independent cause of action that
permits federal injunctive relief to prevent the deprivation of federal
rights by state action.4 Although section 1983 permits federal injunctive
relief, a federal court will not interfere with state court proceedings
unless the proceeding fails to meet the principles formulated by the
Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris.' The Supreme Court principles,
I Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335, as amended, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 968
(1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)). Section 2283 provides that a federal court may not
stay a state court proceeding by granting an injunction unless the injunction is authorized
by an act of Congress, is necessary for the federal court's jurisdiction, or protects or makes
effective the federal court's judgments. Id.; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971)
(discussion of § 2283); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7-9
(1940) (§ 2283 bars indirect stays of state proceedings by injunctions, directed at parties
rather than court itself).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976); note 1 supra (discussion of § 2283).
Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)).
Section 1983 is the recodification of a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id.; See Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 131. The section provides a cause of action in law or in
equity against a person who deprives another person of any rights provided by the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. I1 1979).
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (§ 1983 falls under the authorized ex-
pressly by act of Congress exception to § 2283); see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976)
(§ 1983 actions within exceptions to § 2283); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 n.15
(1975) (§ 2283 does not apply since federal cause of action exists under § 1983); Comment,
Closing the Courthouse Door: The Expanding Rationale of Younger Abstention, 19 B.C. L.
REV. 699, 707-08 (1978) (§ 1983 an exception to § 2283) [hereinafter cited as Closing the Court-
house Door].
5 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). The Supreme Court applied the Younger principles to five
other cases decided on the same day as Younger. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 220
(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971).
In Younger, the state of California was prosecuting Harris for violation of the Califor-
nia Criminal Syndicalism Act. 401 U.S. at 38. Harris filed a complaint in federal district
court asking the court to enjoin the state prosecution. Id. at 38-39. Harris alleged that the
prosecution and the presence of the Syndicalism Act inhibited the exercise of his rights of
free speech and press, rights as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
The Supreme Court recognized a longstanding public policy against federal court in-
terference with pending state court proceedings. 401 U.S. at 43. The Court based the source
of the public policy on the principles of equity, comity, and federalism. Id. The Supreme
Court noted that courts of equity should not act when a remedy at law exists and when the
complaining party will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Id. at 43-44.
The Younger court acknowledged that the purpose of the equity principle was to prevent
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known as the Younger doctrine, require a federal court to apply
equitable principles and dismiss an action that seeks relief also available
in a pending state proceeding.' For example, the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted Younger to provide that a federal court may not intervene by
way of injunction,' or declaratory judgment8 in a pending state criminal
proceeding,9 a quasi-criminal proceeding,10 a state civil contempt pro-
ceeding," or a civil enforcement action brought by a state in its
sovereign capacity. 2
erosion of the role of the jury and to prevent duplicate legal proceedings when one suit
would adequately protect the asserted rights. Id. at 44. The Court defined comity as a pro-
per respect for state function and a belief that it is in the national government's best in-
terest that the federal courts accord respect to the separate functioning of the state. Id.
Lastly, the Younger court found that federalism supported a policy of abstention through
which the national government endeavors to protect federal rights without interfering with
the legitimate activities of the states. Id.
' Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); Laycock, Federal Interference With State
Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194 (discussion of
Younger doctrine); Closing the Courthouse Door, supra note 4, at 701 (discussion of
Younger doctrine); see note 5 supra (discussion of Younger).
401 U.S. at 41.
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971). In Samuels, the Supreme Court held
declaratory relief impermissible when a state criminal prosecution is pending at the time of
the federal suit's initiation. Id. at 72-73. The Samuels Court noted that declaratory
judgments issued during pending state proceedings may serve as a basis for a subsequent
injunction against the pending state proceeding to protect the declaratory judgment. Id.
The Court relied on the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976), which provides
that after a federal court issues a declaratory judgment the district court may enforce it by
granting further relief. 401 U.S. at 72-73. In addition, the Supreme Court found that a
declaratory judgment in effect has the same degree of interference with state proceedings
as do injunctions. Id. The Court observed, however, that under unusual circumstances the
declaratory judgment might be appropriate when the plaintiff has a strong claim for relief
but the injunction is withheld because it is particularly offensive or intrusive. Id. at 73.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 46; see note 5 supra (discussion of Younger).
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-07 (1975). In Huffrnan, the Supreme Court
applied the Younger abstention doctrine to a civil proceeding that was in aid of and closely
related to a criminal statute. Id. at 604; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 54; note 5 supra
(discussion of Younger); note 46 infra (discussion of Huffman).
" Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977). In Juidice, the Supreme Court held that
the Younger principles apply to a case that involves a state's comtempt process. Id. at 335;
see 401 U.S. at 54; note 5 supra (discussion of Younger). The Juidice Court reasoned that the
State's interest in the contempt process is equal to its interest in a criminal proceeding. Id.
at 335-36. The Supreme Court noted that interference with the contempt process, through
which the state vindicates the regular operation of its judicial process, could easily lead to a
negative relfection on the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. Id. at 336.
The Juidice Court did not consider the question of the applicability of Younger to all civil
litigation, thus implying that the Supreme Court would not apply Younger to all civil pro-
ceedings. Id. at 336 n.13.
," Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977). In Trainor, the Supreme Court held
that the principles of Younger and Huffman apply to federal court interference with an
ongoing civil enforcement proceeding brought by the state in its sovereign capacity. Id.; see
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-07 (1975); 401 U.S. at 54; notes 5 & 10 supra
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In Younger the Supreme Court permitted federal intervention
under extraordinary circumstances when the danger of irreparable loss
is serious and immediate." Extraordinary circumstances exist when the
state conducts a proceeding in bad faith or for purposes of harassment,
or when the state flagrantly and patently violates express constitutional
prohibitions in its application of a statute to a criminal proceeding.14 Ir-
reparable loss occurs only when the plaintiff's defense against a single
prosecution cannot eliminate the threat to his federal rights.15 In
Simopoulos v. Virginia State Board of Medicine,"6 the Fourth Circuit ex-
amined whether the Younger doctrine proscribes the maintenance of an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief while a criminal and a civil
case are pending in state courts.1
7
The Commonwealth of Virginia arrested Dr. Simopoulos in November
of 1979 for violating a Virginia abortion statute. The arrest warrant
(discussion of Huffman and Younger). In Trainor, the State was a party in a suit brought to
vindicate important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of its public
assistance programs. 431 U.S. at 444. The Trainor Court noted that a state acts in its
sovereign capacity when it acts to vindicate state policy. Id.
13 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 45-46. Traditionally, showing irreparable injury is im-
portant to obtain an injunction. Therefore, the Younger irreparable injury requirement is
not entirely new. See i&L; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975) (federal intervention
not warranted because circumstances were not extraordinarily nor was danger of irrepara-
ble loss great and immediate); Annot., 44 L.Ed. 2d 692 (1976) (discussion of Younger doctrine
and its exceptions).
14 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54. In Younger, the Supreme Court stated that an
extraordinary circumstance exists if, for example, a statute flagrantly and patently violates
express constitutional prohibitons in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in
whatever and against whomever a court might apply the statute. Id (citing Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941); see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975) (circumstances
must be extraordinary in sense of creating extraordinarily pressing need for immediate
federal equitable relief, not merely in sense of presenting highly unusual factual situation);
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (federal court may intervene only in presence
of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both
serious and immediate); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973) (absent harassment and bad
faith, defendant in pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal
court statutes under which the state prosecutes him); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
230-31 (1972) (exceptional circumstances occur when irreparable injury is both great and im-
mediate, state law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,
and when showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances exists); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (extraordinary circumstances exist in cases of proven
harassment, prosecutions undertaken in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid convic-
tion and other exceptional circumstances when irreparable injury can be shown).
" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 46; see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)
(cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against single criminal prosecution
does not constitute irreparable injury).
16 644 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1981).
'7 Id at 323. The dissent thus concluded that Scruggs does not involve the procedural
due process claims present in Simopoulos. 644 F.2d at 336 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see 630
F.2d at 239.
s Id. at 322; VA. CODE § 18.2-73 (1975). Section 18.2-73 provides that a licensed physi-
cian may perform a lawful abortion during a second trimester of pregnancy only if the physi-
cian performs the abortion in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health or
under the control of the State Board of Mental Health and Retardation. Id
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alleged that Simopoulos performed an unlawful abortion on a minor.1 9
The state court delayed the preliminary hearing at Simopoulos' request.
2
During the delay, Simopoulos instituted a section 1983 action in a federal
district court to enjoin prosecution under the arrest warrant and any
other prosecutions under the abortion statute. 1 Simopoulos brought the
section 1983 action to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.' The
district court applied the Younger doctrine to dismiss the doctor's ac-
tion, holding that to decide the constitutional question would interfere
with the state's prosecution.' Simopoulos appealed the district court's
dismissal to the Fourth Circuit and sought a temporary injunction
against state prosecution pending hearing of the appeal.2 The Fourth
Circuit denied the request -for injunctive relief and subsequently
dismissed the appeal.' Consequently, the state circuit court convicted
and sentenced Simopoulos for violating the state's abortion statute.26
The doctor appealed the decision to the Virginia Supreme Court.
Upon certification of the conviction, the Virginia State Board of
Medicine revoked Dr. Simopoulos' license to practice pursuant to the
Virginia license suspension statute.' Simopoulos applied for reinstate-
" 644 F.2d at 322. The state charged Simopoulos with performing an abortion on a
minor during the second trimester of pregnancy outside a hospital licensed as required by
the Virginia abortion statute. 644 F.2d at 322; see note 18 supra (abortion statute provision).
2 644 F.2d at 322.
21 Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 11 1979).
2 644 F.2d at 322. In Simopoulos, Simopoulos brought the § 1983 suit on the ground
that the Virginia abortion statute, VA. CODE § 18.2-73 on which the Commonwealth of
Virginia based its prosecution, was unconstitutional. Id. The doctor asserted that applica-
tion of the statute was unconstitutional because it was administered in conjunction with
hospital rules that required parental consent for a minor's abortion. Id. at 332 n.1 (Butzner,
J. dissenting); see Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679,687
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (in-hospital requirement unconstitutional because it gave parents of women
under eighteen absolute and possibly arbitrary veto over her abortion). Cf. Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (statutes unqualifiedly imposing provisions for
parental consent are unconstitutional).
"2 644 F.2d at 322.
24 Id.
23I&
Id. The Simopoulos state circuit court convicted the doctor without a jury and
sentenced him to two years imprisonment suspended for good behavior upon the condition
that he serve 30 days in jail. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 1062, 277 S.E.2d
194, 196 (1981).
" 644 F.2d at 322. At the time the Fourth Circuit published the Simopoulos opinion,
Dr. Simopoulos' appeal of his state circuit court criminal conviction was pending before the
Virginia Supreme Court, which subsequently affirmed the doctor's conviction. Simopoulos
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 1077, 277 S.E.2d 194, 205 (1981).
2 644 F.2d at 322; VA. CODE § 54-321.2 (Supp. 1981). Section 54-321.2 provides that the
Board of Medicine will suspend or revoke a physician's license to practice medicine without
a hearing upon conviction of a felony. Id. Section 54-316(3) provides that the Board may sus-
pend or revoke a physician's license indefinitely if it finds the physician guilty of unprofes-
sional conduct. VA. CODE § 54-3163) (Supp. 1981). Section 54-317(1) provides that a physician
is guilty of unprofessional conduct if he performs a criminal abortion. VA. CODE § 54-317(1)
(Supp. 1981). Section 54-321.2 provides that when the Board of Medicine suspends a physi-
cian's license under § 54-321.2, the physician may apply to the Board for reinstatement of his
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ment of his license before the Board of Medicine, seeking a. termination
or stay of the revocation pending appeal of his criminal conviction.' The
Board of Medicine scheduled a hearing to occur in 56 days to consider his
application." The Board of Medicine subsequently heard Simopoulos' ap-
plication regarding revocation of his license.3 ' The Board denied the ap-
plication without disclosing the basis for its decision.2 Simopoulos ap-
pealed the denial of his application to the state circuit court.
33
During the 56 day interim prior to the hearing before the Board of
Medicine, Simopoulos had filed another section 1983 action in the federal
district court in which he had asked for declaratory judgments that the
Virginia abortion statute and the Virginia license suspension statute
were unconstitutional in violation of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses and of the right to privacy implied in the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 4 In addition, Simopoulos asked for injunctive relief, both
preliminary and permanent, to restore his license to practice medicine
and reinstate his previous hospital staff memberships. The district
court, however, dismissed the doctor's section 1983 action, abstaining
from consideration of Simopoulos' attack on the constitutionality of the
Virginia abortion statute. 6 Moreover, the district court found that the
Virginia license suspension statute was reasonable on its face and that
the doctor could apply for a hearing before the Board of Medicine if he
felt aggrieved at the suspension of his license. Simopoulos appealed to
the Fourth Circuit. 8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined whether a federal court
license. VA. CODE § 54-312.2 (Supp. 1981). Upon application the Board will provide a hearing
at the Board meeting that takes place 10 days after receipt of the application. Id The Board
must formally record its proceedings. Id.; see text accompanying notes 32 & 68 infra
(Simopoulos Board did not record proceedings). A physician may appeal any action of the
Board to the circuit court of the county, or the circuit court or corporation court of the city
that has jurisdiction over the physician. VA. CODE § 54-320 (1978).
644 F.2d at 322; see note 28 supra (hearing subsequent to license suspension).
644 F.2d at 322.
3, Id. at 323.
32 Id.; id. at 333 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
644 F.2d at 323. In Simopoulos, the plaintiff based his appeal in the state circuit
court on a claim of inconsistencies between the Board of Medicine's hearing and the re-
quirements of the Virginia Administration Process Act (VAPA). Id.; see VA. CODE §§
9-6.14:1 to 20 (1978). Under § 9-6.14:3(A), the VAPA does not, however, supersede or repeal
additional procedural requirements in present and future basic laws conferring authority on
agencies to make regulations or decide cases. VA. CODE § 9-6.14:3(A) (1978).
644 F.2d at 322-23; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Id at 323.
Id.; see VA. CODE § 18.2-73 (1975); note 22 supra (constitutional attack on abortion
statute).,
' 644 F.2d at 323; see VA. CODE § 54-321.2 (Supp. 1981); note 28 supra (discussion of
license suspension statute). The Simopoulos district court relied on Christhilf v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 1974), to find the Virginia license suspen-
sion statute reasonable on its face. 644 F.2d at 323. The Christhilf court held that due pro-
cess does not always require a hearing. 496 F.2d at 180.
' 644 F.2d at 323.
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could grant injunctive relief under due process considerations when a
civil case, Simopoulos' license suspension action, is pending in a state
court. 9 In addition, the Simopoulos court decided whether declaratory
relief regarding the constitutionality of the state criminal abortion
statute is proper when an appeal is pending in a state court. 0 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 1983
action for both declaratory and injunctive relief.4" The court left redress
of Simopoulos' rights, whether state or federal, to his two pending state
appeals.42
The Simopoulos court first examined judicial precedent regarding
the development of the Younger doctrine."3 The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Younger had dealt only with
abstention from federal interference pending a state criminal pro-
ceeding." The court recognized, however, that the Younger court in-
dicated that the principles that governed abstention from state criminal
proceedings also might apply to abstention from certain state civil pro-
ceedings." The Simopoulos court found that in a Supreme Court decision
subsequent to the Younger decision, the Court extended the Younger
doctrine to state civil proceedings involving the state as a party and
Id. at 323, 329. In Simopoulos, the appellant claimed that his appeal before the
Fourth Circuit involved questions of federal law that were separate and distinct from the
issues he would raise in the state circuit court. 644 F.2d at 323. The Fourth Circuit held that
an attempt to limit state appeals to state issues and federal appeals to federal issues was
. contrary to previous federal court rulings. Id. at 323 n.4; see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
426-27 n.10 (1979) (Younger should not apply to some claims while others are left to federal
forum); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (state court decides both state and
federal issues in action unless state tribunal is not competent to resolve federal issues);
Scruggs v. Campbell, 630 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1980) (state court appropriate forum for
litigation of all issues arising out of controvery).
'o 644 F.2d at 323, 329.
41 Id. at 331.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 26-27, 31-33 supra (Simopoulos state court actions).
'3 644 F.2d at 323-24.
4 Id. at 324. In Simopoulos, the Fourth Circuit maintained that under the Younger
doctrine a federal court must apply equitable estoppel and dismiss an action seeking relief
also available in a pending state proceeding. Id. The Fourth Circuit used the term equitable
estoppel to mean that the principles of equity, comity and federalism estop federal courts
from hearing an action that is pending in a state court. Id.; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
at 54. Historically, the doctrine of equitable estoppel means that a party who misrepresents
an existing fact upon which the other party justifiably relies to his detriment is estopped
from denying his claim to the detriment of the other party. Carruthers v. Whitney, 56
Wash. 327, -, 105 P. 831, 833 (1909); see Rothschild v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 204 N.Y.
458, -, 97 N.E. 879, 881 (1912) (equitable estoppel prevents persons from asserting rights
that would work an injustice).
11 644 F.2d at 324-25; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 45. In Younger, Justice Black,
without distinguishing between criminal and civil state proceedings, observed that federal
courts repeatedly refuse to enjoin pending state proceedings. Id.; see Cousins v. Wigoda,
409 U.S. 1201, 1206 (1972) (Court implied that courts should not enjoin pending criminal or
civil state proceedings); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 983 (1974) (Younger doctrine should not turn on whether pending state proceeding was
criminal or civil).
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operating to further compliance with a state's criminal laws.46 The
Simopoulos court noted that the Court in subsequent decisions broadened
the application of the Younger doctrine from quasi-criminal proceedings
to civil proceedings in which the state was a party." The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, concluded that the Younger doctrine applied to the
Simopoulos license suspension proceeding because the state was a party
and the suspension furthered compliance with Virginia's abortion laws.48
48 644 F.2d at 325; see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). In Huffman,
the lessee of a theater brought an action for injunctive declaratory relief challenging the con-
stitutionality of an Ohio nuisance statute. Id. at 598. The County Court of Common Pleas
ordered Pursue, Ltd. to close its theater for displaying obscene movies in violation of the
nuisance statute. Id. Pursue brought suit in federal district court rather than appealing the
county court judgment within the Ohio court system. Id.
The Huffman Court noted that the State was a party to the Court of Common Pleas
proceeding, and the proceeding was both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes that
prohibit dissemination of obscene materials. Id. at 604. The Court observed that federal in-
terference with a state judicial proceeding resulted in a duplication of judicial proceedings
and could easily be a negative reflection on the state court's ability to decide constitutional
issues. Id The Supreme Court concluded that the federalism basis of Younger was equally
applicable to Huffman-type civil prbceedings as well as to criminal proceedings. Id. at
604-05; see note 5 supra (discussing Younger principles). The Huffman court also determined
that, concomitant to Younger, a party must exhaust its state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in federal court, unless the party can bring its action within a Younger excep-
tion. Id. at 608; see text accompanying notes 13-15 supra (discussing Younger exceptions).
The Huffman Court refused to make general pronouncements upon the applicability of
Younger to all civil litigation. Id. at 607.
'" 644 F.2d at 325-26. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (Younger abstention
applied to civil case in which State was a party); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444
(1977) (Court applied Younger doctrine to civil proceeding in which State is party and State
is interested in protecting public programs); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-37 (1977)
(Court held that Younger principles applied to civil case that dealt with State's contempt
process).
Despite the clear trend in judicial precedent to expand the Younger doctrine, three
Supreme Court cases clarify the parameters of the doctrine. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1974); Lake Carriers' Ass'n
v. McMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1972). In Lake Carriers, the Court found that a § 1983
plaintiff did not have to initiate state proceedings that might provide a remedy if no state
suit is pending when plaintiff commences a federal action. 406 U.S. at 509-10; see Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (plaintiff may seek federal remedy under § 1983 even though
state remedy available); but see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663
(1978) (overruled Monroe v. Pape on other grounds). Moreover, in Steffel, the Court held
that a federal court may not abstain when no state action is pending, even though the state
may have threatened a state action. 415 U.S. at 461-62; cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
349 (1975) (abstention required if state suit initiated prior to federal court action on merits).
In Doran, the Supreme Court held that the Younger abstention does not apply to plaintiffs
merely because their interests are similar to those of parties to pending state proceedings.
422 U.S. at 928-30; ef. Stivers v. Minnesota, 575 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1127 (1979) (requiring federal abstention when plaintiff's interests are similar to
those of parties to pending state proceeding if party brought federal action to interfere with
state proceeding).
48 644 F.2d at 326. The Simopoulos court recognized that a federal district court, in
Rucker v. Wilson, 475 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1979), applied the Younger doctrine to
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After the Fourth Circuit decided that the Younger abstention doc-
trine applied to the pending license suspension proceedings, the court
found that a prior Supreme Court decision foreclosed Simopoulos' at-
tempt to secure either declaratory or injunctive relief against the
Virginia abortion statute.49 The Simopoulos court noted that the doctor
could have challenged federal abstention only by claiming bad faith or
harassment in the Virginia abortion statute's enforcement or the lack of
an opportunity to raise his constitutional claim in the state forum.5 The
court found that Simopoulos made no claim of bad faith and harassment
in the enforcement of the Virginia abortion statute and, therefore, the.
doctor could pursue his constitutional claims only in state court."
Furthermore, the Simopoulos court relied on a Supreme Court deci-
sion, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,5" to hold that the Fourth Circuit should
abstain from granting injunctive relief to Simopoulos regarding the
revocation of his license.' In Huffman, the Supreme Court held that the
Younger doctrine applied to civil proceedings in aid of or closely related
to criminal statutes. 4 The Simopoulos court observed that the
legislature enacted the Virginia license suspension statute in aid of and
for the purpose of maintaining the standards set forth in the Virginia
abortion statute and, therefore, met the Huffman quasi-criminal stan-
dard.55 Although the Simopoulos license suspension was an administra-
tive proceeding rather than a state court proceeding, the Simopoulos
an administrative proceeding similar to the Simopoulos Board's proceeding. Id. at 327. The
Simopoulos court noted that Rucker held that the Younger doctrine applied to ad-
ministrative proceedings in which a right to appeal to state courts exists and the state is a
party. Id The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the Simopoulos Board of Medicine's deci-
sion to revoke the doctor's license was pending in a state court. Id. The court, therefore, did
not have to go so far as to apply Younger abstention to an administrative proceeding. Id. at
327; see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Gibson involved a § 1983 suit
brought by licensed optometrists seeking injunctions to stop the Alabama Board of Op-
tometry hearings on charges of unprofessional conduct according to the Alabama optometry
statute. Id. at 569-70. The Gibson court did not apply the Younger abstention doctrine be-
cause the Optometry Board was biased. Id. at 577. The Younger predicate that requires the
opportunity to raise the federal issues and have them decided in a timely manner by a com-
petent state tribunal, therefore, was lacking. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that
Younger would have applied to the Gibson administrative proceeding if the Younger
predicate was not absent. Id; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 49; cf. Ohio Bureau of
EmpI. Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1977) (since agency waived claim for abstention,
Court did not have to apply Younger abstention).
," 644 F.2d at 329; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126 (1973) (absent harassment or bad
faith, defendant in state criminal proceeding could not challenge a statute under which state
was prosecuting him in federal court).
'0 644 F.2d at 329; see text accompanying notes 13-15 supra (discussion of bad faith or
harassment and Younger exception).
644 F.2d at 329, 331.
5 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
644 F.2d at 329.
" Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975); see text accompanying notes 10 &
46 supra (discussion of Huffman).
644 F.2d at 329; see note 46 supra (Huffnan quasi-criminal standard).
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court recognized that federal courts have applied the Younger doctrine
to administrative proceedings that are subject to judicial review."6 The
Fourth Circuit thus found that the Huffman quasi-criminal standard ap-
plied to the Simopoulos Board's administrative proceeding.' The
Simopoulos court concluded that federal abstention became appropriate
when the doctor appealed to the state circuit court even though no state
suit was pending when Simopoulos filed his federal action. 5
Dissenting in Simopoulos, Judge Butzner concurred with the majori-
ty's affirmance of the dismissal of Simopoulos' claim that the Virginia
abortion statute was unconstitutional. 9 The dissent argued, however,
that the Younger doctrine did not require abstention from considering
the doctor's claim that the Board of Medicine revoked his license in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 0 Judge Butzner
noted that the Supreme Court has interpreted Younger to require, as a
prerequisite for a federal court's abstention, that the opportunity be pre-
sent to raise the federal issues and to have them decided in a timely
manner by a state tribunal. 1 The Supreme Court long has recognized
that due process includes the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
and timely manner.
2
' 644.F.2d at 329; see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Gibson v. Ber-
ryhill, 411 U.S 564, 577 (1973) (pendency of administrative proceeding subject to broad judi-
cial review supports Younger treatment); Rucker v. Wilson, 475 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (Younger doctrine applied to administrative proceeding when State is party and
proceeding involves enforcement of state criminal laws); VA. CODE § 54-320 (1978) (right to
appeal to state courts); note 48 supra (discussion of Gibson and Rucker).
" 644 F.2d at 329; see note 56 supra (Younger doctrine applied to administrative pro-
ceedings).
" 644 F.2d at 329-30. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1975) (Younger
abstention applies when a state begins criminal proceeding against plaintiff after plaintiff
filed complaint in federal court but before federal court proceeded on merits); Scruggs v.
Campbell, 630 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1980) (although no state suit pending when plaintiff filed
federal action, federal abstention correct because federal court had conducted no proceed-
ings on merits of claim when school board sought review of administrative decision in state
court); text accompanying notes 28-38 supra (discussion of leave suspension proceedings and
susequent appeal to state court). The Simopoulos court also concluded that the Supreme
Court did not allow appeal to a federal court when state remedies are available because the
losing party in the state court believes his chances on appeal in his state are not favorable.
644 F.2d at 330; see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610 (1975) (truncation of state
proceedings not allowed). The court rejected as superfluous the doctor's claim that he was
not attacking his conviction but that he only wanted relief during the time in which the
state proceeding was pending. 644 F.2d at 330-31. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
declaratory relief has the same effect as an injunction and, therefore, falls within the
Younger doctrine. Id at 331; see note 8 supra (Samuels Court's decision regarding
declaratory and injunctive relief under Younger doctrine).
" 644 F.2d at 331 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
0 Id.
61 Id.; see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973); note 48 supra (discussion of Gib-
son).
644 F.2d at 332 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540
(1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
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In addition-to Dr. Simopoulos' right to a timely hearing, Judge Butz-
ner maintained that the due process clause protects a physician's prop-
erty interest in his professional license."3 The dissent reasoned that the
lapse of 56 days, from the time the Board of Medicine revoked Simopoulos'
license to the time of his reinstatement hearing, did not satisfy the re-
quirement of the due process clause for a prompt post-revocation hear-
ing when a physician's license is at stake.6 4 Although agreeing with the
majority that the initial revocation of the doctor's license without a hear-
ing did not offend due process,65 the dissent pointed out *that the
Supreme Court conditioned its sanction of prehearing revocation upon
the state furnishing prompt judicial or administrative review to defini-
tively determine the issues.66 Judge Butzner concluded that the lack of
assurance of a prompt post-revocation hearing, as well as the actual
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979)
(due process clause protects property interest in professional license). The requirements of
procedural due process apply to the deprivation of interests that the fourteenth amend-
ment's protection of liberty and property encompasses. Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A person must have more than an abstract need to have a
property interest in a benefit such as a professional license. Id& at 577. Moreover, to, have a
property interest one must have a legitimate claim to the benefit. Id.; see Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (once licenses are issued, they may become essential in pursuit of
livelihood, thus requiring fourteenth amendment procedural due process to suspend); Perry
v. City of Chicago, 480 F. Supp. 498, 502 (1979) (peddler's license restricted long before its is-
suance to him, therefore, peddler had no property interest in form of right to peddle in
restricted area). Property interests are created by existing rules, such as state law, and not
by the Constitution. 408 U.S. at 577; see Petite Auberge Village, Inc. v. California Employ-
ment Dev. Dept., 650 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1981) (right to recover delinquent taxes during
bankruptcy proceedings as condition in transfer of liquor license stems from state's power
to define state created property rights).
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court established certain factors to determine
the extent to which due process protects the erroneous deprivation of a property interest.
422 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Private interests affected by the official action, risk of wrongful
deprivation, and the government's interest are factors that require consideration. Id; see
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1979) (weight of private interest and risk of error not
substantial enough to outweigh state's compelling interest in highway safety regarding
prehearing suspension of driver's license); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) (nature of
property interest in license to operate motor vehicle is not serious enough to require hear-
ing prior to revocation). When a state's action implicates the fourteenth amendment's pro-
tected interests of liberty and property, the right to a prior hearing is paramount. Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
Id.; see 644 F.2d at 323, 330 n.37 (Simopoulos majority holding license suspension
statute constitutional); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1979) (evidentiary hearing not re-
quired prior to suspension of horse trainer's license); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1979) (neither nature nor weight of private interest involved compel conclusion that sum-
mary suspension procedures are unconstitutional); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 1974) (due process does not always require hearing before
doctor's privileges are suspended).
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979)
(state is entitled to impose interim suspension pending prompt judicial or administrative
hearing that would definitely determine issues); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979)
(summary suspension hearings constitutional, particularly in view of immediately available
post-suspension hearing).
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lapse of 56 days, deprived the doctor of his property interest in his
license withobt procedural due process of law."
The dissent noted that the due process clause, in addition to protect-
ing property interests, requires an administrative agency to state the
findings and the reasoning underlying its decision. 8 Judge Butzner
found that the Simopoulos Board made no findings and issued no opinion
when it announced it would not reinstate the doctor's license, thus deny-
ing the doctor procedural due process.69 The dissenting judge concluded
that whei an administrative agency denies a licensee procedural due
process, the Younger doctrine does not require federal abstention merely
because the licensee can seek judicial review of the administrative deci-
sion.7"
The Fourth Circuit's decision to abstain from granting declaratory
and injunctive relief regarding the constitutionality of the Virginia abor-
tion statute is rational. The Supreme Court consistently has applied the
Younger doctrine of abstention in situations when a criminal prosecution
is pending in a state court.7' Simopoulos did not meet the requirements
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 335; see VA. CODF § 54-321.2 (Supp. 1981) (Board shall record license suspen-
sion proceedings formally); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980) (medical nature of in-
quiry and protection of defendant's liberty interest requires written statement of evidence
relied on by Board); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (fact finder must provide
written statement of evidence relied on and reasons for disciplinary action against inmate);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) (validity of administrative agency's order
rests upon findings of fact when statute requires findings of fact as condition precedent to
an order).
Courts have held that express findings of fact are not necessary when administrative
action is not subject to judicial review. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432
(1935); Lisbon Regional School Dist. v. Landaff School Dist., 114 N.H. 674, -, 327 A.2d
727, 730 (1974); cf. Saporiti v. Zoning Bd. of App., 137 Conn. 478, -, 78 A.2d 741, 743
(1951) (no findings of fact are necessary in informal administrative proceeding when not re-
quired by statute).
69 644 F.2d at 335 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
70 Id. In the Simopoulos dissent, Judge Butzner, distinguished Huffman, Scruggs, and
Rucker with respect to the doctor's due process claims. Id at 336 (Butzner, J., dissenting);
see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Scruggs v. Campbell, 630 F.2d 237 (4th Cir.
1980); Rucker v. Wilson, 475 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1979); notes 10, 46, 48, 58 supra
(discussion of Huffman, Scruggs, and Rucker). In Huffman, the complainant challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute in a state court. 420 U.S. at 594; see note 46 supra (discus-
sion of Huffman). The Simopoulos dissent argued that contrary to the Simopoulos action,
Huffman did not involve proof that state remedies were procedurally defective. 644 F.2d at
336 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Unlike Huffman, Simopoulos presented the issue that the state
proceedings deprived the claimant of his property without affording due process of law. Id.
In Scruggs, the federal statute allowed review of administrative proceedings in state
or federal court. 630 F.2d at 238. The Fourth Circuit in Scruggs held that even when the ag-
grieved party had petitioned a state court the opposing party could forestall state review
by bringing a federal suit before administrative proceedings were complete. Id- at 238-39.
Judge Butzner noted that the terms of the statute in Scruggs, in contrast to Simopoulos,
provided that one judicial forum was sufficient. 644 F.2d at 336 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see
630 F.2d at 239. The dissent thus concluded that Scruggs does not involve the procedural
due process claims present in Simopoulos. 644 F.2d at 336 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see 630
F.2d at 239.
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necessary to preclude Younger abstention which requires a showing of
immediate irreparable harm under extraordinary circumstances. 2 In ad-
dition, the Simopoulos state court did not conduct the criminal pro-
ceeding in bad faith or for purposes of harassment."' Moreover, the
State's application of the Virginia abortion statute did not flagrantly and
patently violate express constitutional prohibitions.74 The Supreme
Court has held that in order to meet the Younger test of an extra-
ordinary circumstance, a statute must violate express constitutional pro-
hibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever and
against whomever a court may apply the statute. 5 In addition, in order
to demonstrate irreparable harm, the Younger doctrine requires that a
plaintiff be able to eliminate a threat to his federal rights by his defense
to a single prosecution." The Fourth Circuit properly found that
Simopoulos did not demonstrate that the Virginia abortion statute caused
immediate irreparable harm under extraordinary circumstances and
thus the court properly denied injunctive relief.7 Finally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit properly dismissed the doctor's request for declaratory relief
because the Younger doctrine applies equally to declaratory as well as
injunctive relief."8
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit did not follow- prior judicial
precedents in its decision to abstain from Dr. Simopoulos' claim that the
Board of Medicine denied him procedural due process of law in its revo-
cation of his medical license. The Supreme Court has held that a person
has a property right in a professional license to which he has legitimate
entitlement. 9 Simopoulos had a property interest in his license to prac-
tice medicine because he depended on the license for his livelihood." Due
process requirements protect the erroneous deprivation of a property in-
The dissent also distinguished Rucker. 644 F.2d at 336 (Butzner, J., dissenting). The
doctor in Rucker did not lose his license pending the Board of Medicine's hearing as did
Simopoulos. 475 F. Supp. at 1165. Judge Butzner concluded that the federal court would
have provided the doctor in Rucker federal relief if the Board had deprived him of his prop-
erty interest without due process of law. 644 F.2d at 336. The dissent also weighed the in-
terests of the state in protecting public interests against the harm a physician suffers by
revocation of his professional license. Id at 337. Consequently, Judge Butzier found that no
likelihood of danger to the public existed if the Board allowed Simopoulos to practice
medicine pending his appeal. Id.
" See note 5 supra (discussing Younger and citing its five companion cases).
" See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra (discussion of immediate irreparable
harm).
See Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 1077, 277 S.E.2d 194, 205 (1981);
note 14 supra (discussion of extraordinary circumstances).
"1 See text accompanying note 14 supra (discussion of irreparable injury).
,' See text accompanying note 14 supra (example of flagrant constitutional violation).
See text accompanying note 15 supra (defense of single prosecution).
" 644 F.2d at 329, 331.
8 Id. at 331; see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971) (Younger doctrine applies
equally to declaratory as well as injunctive relief); note 8 supra (discussion of samuels).
" Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Id.; see 644 F.2d 321, 333-34 (1981) (Butzner, J., dissenting); note 63 supra (property
interest in license).
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terest to the extent that private interests affected by the deprivation
and the risk of wrongful deprivation outweigh the government's interest
in the deprivation. 1 Although the Simopoulos court did not resolve this
balancing test, the doctor's private interest in his license could arguably
outweigh the government's interest in revoking the doctor's license.2
Once an administrative agency revokes a license, due process re-
quires a prompt judicial or administrative hearing to definitely deter-
mine the issues.83 Courts have held that considerations of delay are rele-
vant in making abstention determinations. 4 Consequently, the Simopoulos
dissent correctly argued that the lack of assurance of a prompt post-
revocation hearing, as well as the actual lapse of 56 days, denied the doc-
tor of his property right in violation of due process of law.85 The denial of
a property right without procedural due process of law clearly does not
provide an adequate forum for a plaintiff to raise his constitutional
claims.8 The Virginia State Board of Medicine thus did not provide an
adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims as required for the
Younger abstention doctrine to apply.
In Simopoulos, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the Younger doc-
trine applied to civil cases in which the state was a party and in which
the statute was quasi-criminal.88 The court failed to notice, however, that
Younger abstention may not apply before the opportunity to have a
prompt and competent state tribunal test is met. 9 The Simopoulos
8 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
86 (1972); note 63 supra (discussion of Mathews). In Fuentes, the Supreme Court held that
any significant taking of property is within the purview of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 407 U.S. at 86. The Court noted that the fourteenth amendment
draws no limitations around three-day, ten-day, or fifty-day deprivations of property. Id.
The length or severity of a deprivation is a factor to weigh in determining the appropriate
form of hearing. Id.
See 644 F.2d at 337 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (no likelihood of danger to public if
Simopoulos practices medicine pending appeal); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973)
(Supreme Court declared unconstitutional statute similar to Virginia abortion statute).
E.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979); see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19
(1979). In Mackey, the Supreme Court held that the prehearing suspension of a driver's
license to be constitutional because it afforded an immediate post-suspension hearing. Id. at
19.
, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972); see Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 306 n.3
(4th Cir. 1980) (considerations of delay are relevant in making abstention determinations);
accord, Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964) (abstention not proper
because case delayed too long).
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1973) (Younger presupposes opportunity to have competent state tribunal hear issues in
timely manner).
8 644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973).
644 F.2d at 334 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see note 5 supra (discussion of Younger).
' 644 F.2d at 329-31; see text accompanying notes 45-49 supra (Younger doctrine's ap-
plication to civil cases in which state is party).
89 644 F.2d at 331-32 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 61-64 supra
(prompt and competent state tribunal test).
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